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Abstract
Recent debates and comments in the Turkish mass media, especially after the last 
municipal elections-i.e. after the unexpected victory of the religious-based Welfare 
Party (RP) and the failure of the centre parties-are concentrated on the need of a 
new electoral system. However, there does not exist a consensus between the main 
actors, political parties. While some believe that the country needs an electoral system 
which will bring governability, stability and order, some others insist on the importance 
of full proportionality of an electoral system.
Accordingly, in this study, the electoral systems theory is described. That is, 
history, categorisation, operation and political consequences of electoral systems are 
elaborated. Next, the historical development and implications of electoral systems in 
Turkey are observed. Of course, the debates that took place in times of electoral 
reform-including the recent ones- are studied in depth.
Finally, the limited number of electoral reform alternatives and related 
discussions are introduced.
özet
Yeni bir seçim sistemi ihtiyacı, son günierde-özellikle de Refah Partisi’nin son yerel 
seçimlerdeki sürpriz başarısından sonra--Türk basınının ve siyasilerinin gündemini en 
fazla meşgul eden konuların başında gelmektedir. Ancak, yeni sistemin niteliği 
konusunda siyasi partiler arasında bir uzlaşma beklemek faydasızdır. Çünkü, yeni 
sistem seçiminde bazıları yönetilebilirlik, istikrar ve düzen gibi ilkelere öncelik tanırken, 
diğer bir grup ise mümkün olduğunca nispi ve adaletli sonuçlar çıkaran sistemleri 
tercih etmektedirler.
Bu çalışmada, tarihçesi, gruplanması, işlemesi ve siyasi sonuçları ile seçim 
sistemleri teorisi tanıtılmaktadır. Bunu takiben, Türkiye'de uygulanan seçim 
sistemleri ve bunların siyasi etkileri, her reform döneminde-son gelişmeler dahil- 
ortaya çıkan tartışmalara da yer verilerek İncelenmektedir.
Son olarak, olası seçim reformu önerileri ve bunlar üzerine yapılan akademik 
tartışmalar geniş bir biçimde ele alınmaktadır.
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1
Theory of 
Electoral Systems
The aim of that study is to observe the history of electoral systems in Turkey and if 
possible, to make some reasonable reform suggestions for the electoral system for the 
electoral engineers, therefore I think it will be a good idea to begin with the theory of 
electoral systems, history, categorisation, operation, and consequences. Then, next 
chapters may deal with the more specific Turkish case.
1.1 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A broad definition, explains elections as "institutionalised procedures for the 
choosing of officeholders by some or all of the recognised members of an 
organ isation .S te in  Rokkan, in the study of electoral systems, takes the 
"organisation" as the territorially defined units of the nation-state-the self-governing 
local community and the overarching unitary or federal body politic.  ^ Those 
organisations present a large variety of electoral arrangements during their lifetime.
Rokkan brings an historical analysis for the study of these variations. The first 
period in that analysis is the maintenance of equalitarian electoral democracy, or one 
man, one vote, one value. Second is the period of standardisation of electoral 
practices. And the last stage is the development of alternative procedures for the 
translation of votes into representation (seats), that is development of political 
engineering.
1.1.1 One Man, One Vote
For each country, this dimension can be analysed through an "ideal-type" model of 
five successive phases.
# The first phase was characterised by the recognition of membership in some 
corporate estate as a condition of political citizenship. ^
# The second was the increasing standardisation of franchise rules, the strict 
regulation of access to the political arena (under a regime censitaire) and the 
maintenance of formal equality of influence among the citizens allowed to vote under 
the given property or income criteria.
# In the next phase, the suffrage was extremely extended but some other 
inequalities still persisted.'*
# Fourth, all social and economic criteria of qualification for men over a given 
age were abolished. Although there were no formal inequalities of voting rights within 
the electorates of a constituency, some differences regarding the weight of votes 
across constituencies did not disappear.
# Finally, steps were taken toward the maximisation of universal and equal 
citizenship rights, such as the extension of the suffrage to women and young people 
(down to 18); equalisation of voter-representative ratios throughout the nation and 
constituencies.
While some countries (England, Belgium, Sweden, etc.) passed those stages 
in a sequence^ and some passed them with abrupt and revolutionary changes^, the 
electoral histories of the other countries took place between the two."^
Nevertheless, by the end of World War I, most European countries had 
maintained manhood suffrage, many of them maintaining women suffrage as well. 
And following the World War II, the principle of "one man, one vote" gained ground 
throughout the world.
1.1.ii Standardisation of Electoral Practices
As the franchise has been extended to masses (in the previous phase), there was a 
need for the standardisation of electoral practices. This included all of the 
administrative procedures during the electoral process: The establishment of 
registers; maintenance of order at the polling stations; casting of the vote; secrecy of 
the process; recording of the act in the register; counting of votes and choices; the 
calculation of outcomes.
The aim of all these procedures was to insure the independence of the 
(mostly)) economically dependent elector's decision against the sanctions of his 
superiors.
Though standardisation process might seem to be a detail, one should not 
forget the historical context that any attempt, to uphold strict rules of secrecy in those 
societies with low levels of economic development, was bound to run into difficulties. 
Therefore, the standardisation of electoral practices had an important share on the 
emergence of an independent and conscious mass electorate.
1.1.Hi Development of Alternative Electoral Formulas
The emergence of mass electorates and standardised elections gave way to the 
development of a great variety of alternative formulas for translating votes into seats 
and then to the discussion of pros and cons of these formulas.
In the succeeding pages, the characteristics of these systems of electoral 
representation will be observed.
1.2 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
In democracies, elected officials make decisions on behalf of the people. The election 
of these representatives is performed by the electoral system. Thus, an electoral 
system is the set of methods for translating the citizens' votes into representatives' 
seats. Though there exists a common understanding about the major consequences 
for proportionality of election outcomes and party systems; about the variables of 
electoral systems, students of electoral systems have alternating views. Douglas Rae 
divides the working of an electoral system into three phases, “each of which is an 
important source of variation," namely the ballot, district magnitude and formula.®
Lijphart, in his latest work,’  describes the electoral systems in terms of four 
basic properties and four minor but not necessarily negligible "other” variables;
1.2.1 Electoral Formulas
Three main types of electoral formulas, with their subtypes, are used in democratic 
countries; majoritahan formulas with plurality, two-ballot systems, and the alternative 
vote as the main subtypes, PR with largest remainders, highest averages, and single 
transferable vote formulas, and semi-proportional types like the limited vote.
1.2.i.a MAJORITARIAN FORMULAS
The early systems of electoral representation rested on some kind of a majority 
principle. According to that principle, the will of a part of the electorate was taken to 
express the will of the whole, and all the participants were to obey the decision 
reached through this procedure. During the early phases of electoral development, 
different versions of majoritarian systems were used in most countries.‘o
Of the many majoritarian formulas that exist in theory only three have been in 
actual use: plurality, majority-plurality and alternative vote. The first of these stipulated 
one round of election, with decisions by simple plurality. The second and the third 
both agreed on preventing the possibility of a candidate winning a constituency on a 
minority vote and required absolute majorities in the first round.
The “plurality" formula (first-past-the-post, FPTP) is the simplest one. the 
candidate who receives the most votes, either a majority or plurality, is elected. It had 
been in England since the Middle Ages and had been used to guarantee the election 
of "two knights from every shire and two burgesses from every borough" to the House 
of Commons. It soon spread to the other English colonies. Five countries have used 
plurality, namely Canada, India, New Zealand, England, and the United States.
The “majority-plurality" formulas require an absolute majority-i.e. more than 
half of the valid votes-for election. As the maintenance of an absolute majority without 
any arrangement happens rarely, one way to fulfil this requirement is to conduct a run­
off second ballot. The rule in the elections for the French National Assembly, for 
instance, is that an absolute majority is needed for election on the first ballot. If the
first ballot does not produce that majority, a second ballot is held shortly after the first 
and the candidate with the most votes, i.e. plurality, wins.
The rules concerning who can participate have varied. In the Third Republic of 
France, any candidate could participate in the second ballot, whether or not he had 
competed in the first. However, during the Fifth Republic, the only candidates allowed 
to compete in the second ballot are those who have gained 12.5% of the registered 
electorate in the first ballot. The second ballot, thus, can have more than two 
candidates, but the usual second-ballot pattern in France is a race between the two 
strongest candidates, as the weakest ones (those failing to win a minimum 
percentage of the vote in the first ballot—12.5 percent in France) are forced to 
withdraw in favour of stronger candidates of allied parties.
Australia is the only country using the "alternative vote”.^  ^ It is employed to 
elect a single representative who has the support of the majority of the electorate and 
to prevent the need for a runoff election.
The voters are asked to indicate their preferences among the candidates by 
placing a number next to the name of each of the candidate If a candidate receives 
an "absolute majority" of the first preferences, he or she is elected; otherwise, the 
weakest candidate (the one with the fewest number "1" votes) is eliminated and 
his/her ballots are redistributed among the remaining candidates according to the 
second preferences of these ballots. This time, a candidate obtaining the absolute 
majority with the first-preference votes plus transferred votes, is declared elected. If 
the second count does not result with a winner, the process of eliminating the 
candidate with minimum vote support and transferring his/her ballots is continued 
until a winner emerges.
1.2J.b PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (PR)
These majoritarian electoral methods were under heavy attacks in the later phases of 
démocratisation. The reason was that, although the extension of the suffrage made 
possible the organisation of a strong lower-class or ethnic-based parties (e g.
Communists), the electoral systems used-majoritarian formulas--have not given them 
the opportunity to be significantly represented in the parliament. The systems that 
needed absolute majority, the majority-plurality system and the alternative vote, set 
the highest barrier as 50% in the first ballot (or count)!^.
Historically, there are two factors influential on the spread of proportional 
representation: First is the respect for minorities. To put it in another way, the earliest 
moves toward PR appeared in the most ethnically heterogeneous countries. And the 
second influential factor was the anti socialist strategy. When the working class 
parties wanted to gain access to the parliaments (after the World W ar I) and 
increased their popular support, the old centre parties realised that entering the 
elections using the existing majoritarian electoral formulas would be a gamble for 
themselves. Therefore they demanded PR in order to protect their positions.
Nevertheless, PR systems have been the most common type of electoral 
systems. The purpose of the introduction of PR in many countries was to achieve 
greater proportionality and better minority representation than the earlier majoritarian 
electoral methods. The basic principle of PR is quite simple, the share of seats 
awarded to any party should be equal to the share of the vote which it has won. But, 
this is an idealised state and because of different intervening variables, such as 
district magnitude and the kind of PR-formula chosen, it is impossible to expect it 
work that way in a country.
One common classification of PR formulas is the one between the "List-PR" 
systems and "Single Transferable Vote (STV)."^’’ In the former one, the allocation of 
seats is based upon party lists. However, in the latter (STV), the voters cast a 
preferential vote for individual candidates from various parties.
The other classification brought by Lijphart is the one between the PR systems 
using "one-tier districting" or "complex districting"^^. For example, a country may be 
divided into a number of districts (20, 30 or more) and may also have a national 
district.
Below, the basic principles of these formulas will be introduced:
1.2.i.b.1 List Systems vs. Single Transferable Vote 
List Systems
As noted before, in this kind of PR, voters vote for lists of parties. Bogdanor classifies 
the list systems according to four criteria:
"(a) whether list is national or sub-national, i.e., regional or local; (b) whether the 
proportional allocation of seats is at national level or in multi-member constituencies;
(c) whether the system allows voters to choose between different candidates of their 
preferred party-or even across parties—or whether it confines them to voting for a party list, 
with the order of candidates being determined by the party; and (d) the nature and size of 
the threshold.
These variances will be further elaborated while dealing with the other basic/
elements of electoral systems. But now, as we are observing the formulas used in 
different systems, List-PR systems will be subdivided further according to the 
mathematical formula used to translate votes into seats. Although many PR formulas 
have been invented in democracies, those actually in use are not more than five or six. 
Two major groupings exist; highest averages and largest remainder formulas.
Highest averages (divisor) Formulas: Two highest averages methods are in use for the 
allocation of seats to parties: D'Hondt and modified Sainte-Lagud. According to these 
formulas, seats are awarded sequentially to parties having the highest average 
number of votes per seat until all seats are allocated; each time a party receives a 
seat, its average goes down. These averages are not averages as normally defined 
but depend on the given set of divisors that the system in use, either D’Hondt or 
modified Sainte-Lagu§, prescribes. The d'Hondt formula uses the integers {1, 2, 3, 
4,..} and the modified Sainte-Lague uses {1.4, 3, 5, 7 , . .p  as divisors. An example 
allocation of a six-member district with both formulas is presented in Appendix.
The most frequently applied formula, i.e. d'Hondt, has "a slight bias in favour of 
large parties as against small parties."^  ^ Sainte-Lagu6 method, on the other hand, 
approximates proportionality very closely, and works for the advantage of the middle-
sized parties by lowering the advantage obtained under the d'Hondt formula by the 
largest party^ ,^ and by raising the threshold at which small parties begin to win
seats. 23
Largest Remainders (quota) Formulas: The three most common largest remainder 
formulas are Hare, Droop and Imperiali quotas. The first common step of these 
formulas is to calculate a quota of votes that quarantees the parties a seat. Then, a 
party wins as many seats as it has quotas of votes. The unallocated seats, at the end 
of that procedure, are given to those parties having the largest numbers of unused 
(remaining) votes. The Hare quota is the simplest of the three: total number of valid 
votes divided by the number of seats in a district. The Droop quota, on the other hand, 
divides the total number of valid votes by the number of seats plus 1, and finally, the 
Imperiali quota divides by the number of seats plus 2. As it was the case for the 
highest averages formulas, example allocations of an 8-member district under each of 
largest remainders formulas are presented in Appendix.
The Hare quota tends to yield closely proportional results as against the Droop 
and Imperiali formulas.2·*
Single Transferable Vote
The single transferable vote23 was developed by the English lawyer Thomas Hare and 
endorsed by John Stuart Mill. According to Bogdanor, its starting point was a radically 
different conception of representation from that of majoritarian systems. While the 
representation in the latter was territorial, the advocates of STV saw representation as 
fundamentally personal. T h e  aim of the system, therefore is to elect the 
parliamentarian who can reflect the elector's point of view. If the voter does not agree 
with his MP, according to the advocates of STV, he is regarded as non-represented 
and his votes are wasted. Thus the system tries to ensure that the number of wasted 
votes is minimised and as many of the electorate as possible are able to elect an MP 
of their choice. Accordingly, STV allows preferential voting. It gives the voter the power
]0
to choose between candidates of the same party or from another party. This 
differentiates it from the list-PR which allows minimal or no choice.
Though STV is very different than the other PR formulas as the voters cast 
their votes for individual candidates, it also requires the choice of a quota. This quota 
is realised by adding 1 to the Droop quota. In the first step the ballots are counted 
according to the first preferences. If one or more candidates have obtained the quota 
or more than the quota of votes they are elected. In the second count, the surplus 
votes, i.e. number of votes taken subtracted from the quota, of the elected candidates 
are transferred to their second preferences.After the transfer of surplus votes, 
candidates having obtained a quota are elected. But, if none of the candidates can 
obtain the necessary votes in that count, the weakest candidate is eliminated from the 
allocation process, his/her votes are sorted and counted according to»next (second, or 
lower) preferences and consequently, they are distributed to those preferences. This 
procedure, elimination of the weakest candidates, continues until another candidate 
exceeds the quota and then, when the last seat is allocated the process comes to an 
end.
STV is admired by the students of electoral systems, because it permits voting 
for individual candidates and yields proportional results. 2« But the politicians do not 
tend to use it.^  ^ Ireland and Malta are the only countries using the system.
1.2.i.b.2 Single-Tier vs. Two-Tier Districting
Lijphart makes another classification within the PR systems; those having “single-tier 
districting“ and “two-tier districting“ (complex districting, in Rae's terminology).^® In the 
systems using the former districting, the seats are allocated in one way, whether there 
are single or multi-member constituencies. For example, all of the 120 MPs of Israel 
and 152 of Ireland are elected with the same formulas (d'Hondt, STV respectively) in 
one national district, as in the case of Israel, or in about 40 districts (Ireland).
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According to Lijphart's study, 32 of the 52 PR systems use single-tier 
districting in the elections. Interestingly, the most frequently used mathematical 
formula in single-tier districting systems is the least proportional d’Hondt method.^*
On the other hand, remaining 20 PR-type systems use two-tier (complex) 
districting. The fundamental principle of two-tier districting is the combination of "the 
advantage of reasonably close voter representative contact offered by the smaller 
districts with the advantage of greater proportionality and minority representation 
offered by larger districts.
Two types of two tier-districting is actually in use: remainder transfer and 
adjustment seats systems.
In the remainder transfer systems, in the lower-tier districts, one of the largest 
remainders formulas is applied, but instead of allocating the remaining seats to the 
parties with the highest remainders of votes in these districts, all remaining votes and 
seats are transferred to the higher-tier districts and allocated to the parties there. Here 
the formula at the lower level is decisive. What is of crucial importance for the 
proportionality of the outcome is how many seats will be available at the higher level- 
which is determined by the lower-tier formula. Only Hare method produces a sufficient 
number of remaining seats to be allocated in the higher-tier, as the Hare quota is 
larger than the other largest remainders quotas (i.e. Droop and Imperiali). According 
to the electoral system in Greece after 1989, for instance, most of the seats are 
allocated by means of largest remainders-Droop formula in the lower-tier, and those 
remaining seats are allocated in the higher-tier (after the translation of votes to that 
second tier) according to the largest remainders-Hare method.
In the second type, in adjustment seats system, the districts at the lower-level 
are used for the initial allocation of seats, but the final allocation takes place at the 
higher level on the basis of obtained votes in all of the lower-tier districts. Most 
commonly, a certain number of adjustment seats are provided at the higher level in 
order to correct the disproportional outcomes that may have occurred at the lower 
level. In that category, the higher-tier formulas are decisive. Most are divisor methods
J2
(d'Hondt in Germany and Iceland, and modified Sainte-Lagu6 in Sweden and 
Norway), '^*
German elections is a perfect example of that system. Since 1987, 50% of the 
seats are allocated in the single-member lower-tier districts using the plurality formula, 
and the other 50% are allocated proportionately in the higher-tier according to the 
largest remainders-Hare (before 1987, for about 40 years this higher-tier formula was 
d'Hondt). German case will be rather significant if we discuss the implications of the 
electoral systems and the possible reform options in place of them.
1.2J.C SEMI-PROPORTIONAL (MIXED) FORMULAS:
These are some systems that are non-PR and non-majoritarian. But Lijphart shows 
that these are closer to PR than to majoritarian system s.The most common of these 
mixed systems is the Japanese single non-transferable vote (SNTV). However, as the 
SNTV is a special case of another kind of electoral system, that is limited voting (LV), 
before looking at how it works the characteristics of that electoral system will be 
observed.
If the elector has one less vote in a multi-member constituency than the 
number of candidates to be elected, then the system of election is known to be limited 
voting. Bogdanor notes that LV attempts to remedy a weakness-under-or-non- 
representation of minorities and women—in the plurality system.^® In Britain, for 
instance, the voters were given two votes in three-member constituencies, and three- 
votes in four-member constituencies between 1867 and 1885.^^
The single non-transferable vote, used in Japan for years before the recent 
electoral reform, is a special case of the limited vote giving the elector only one vote in 
a multi-member constituency. In this case, the minority party can gain representation 
if it puts one candidate and wins over one-third of the votes (in a two-seated 
constituency), or wins over one-fourth of the votes in a three-seated constituency. In 
Japan, from 1947 on, SNTV has been applied in districts with an average of almost 
four seats. Lijphart's observation about the LV and SNTV is that the more limited the
]3
number of votes each voter has, and the larger the number of seats at constituency, 
the more LV tends to deviate from plurality and the more it resembles PR.^®
In many respects, including the average district magnitude, Japanese SNTV 
resembles Irish Single Transferable Vote. The principle difference is that SNTV 
appears to be less proportional than STY because no votes can be transferred. 
However, it is found to be more proportional than the non-PR systems.·^“
1.2.Ü District Magnitude
The second dimension of electoral systems is the district magnitude, which is defined 
as the number of representatives elected in a district (constituency). All of the 
students of electoral systems agree on the strong influence of that variable. George 
Horwill had referred to district magnitude as "the all important factor.'"‘i According to 
Rae, "whatever the electoral formula, district magnitude will exert an influence."'*2
Majoritarian formulas may be applied in both single-member and multi­
member districts, but single-member districts have become the rule in the countries 
where those formulas are applied, England, New Zealand, Canada, the United States 
and Australia.
Proportional and semi-proportional formulas, on the other hand, require multi­
member districts, ranging from two-member to a single nation-wide one. As Rae 
states, "the importance of district magnitudes for the relationship between electoral law 
and party system hinges upon the proportionality of the electoral system-the degree 
to which each party's share of the votes is equalled by its share of the seats,"·*® For 
example, a party representing a 10 percent minority is more likely to win a seat in a 
ten-member district than a five-member or a single-member district. Therefore, single­
member or two-member districts are not compatible with the principle of 
proportionality and conversely, a nation-wide district is optimal for a proportional 
translation of votes into seats.
In two-tier districting PR-systems, the district magnitudes at the lower-tier are 
small, usually less than 10 seats; Germany, for instance, has taken the idea of small
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lower-tier districts, providing close voter-representative contact, by adopting single­
member districts at the lower level. On the other hand, in all of the two-tier systems, 
the effect of small magnitude (that is less proportionality) at the lower-tier is overridden 
at the higher level. At that level, the district magnitudes are all sizeable, ranging from 
a minimum of well over 20 seats to the huge national district of more than 600 seats 
in Italian elections.
Comparing single-tier and two-tier systems, generally lower-tier magnitudes 
are lower and, higher-tier magnitudes are higher than the magnitudes of one-tier 
systems.*”
1.2.iii Electoral Threshold
This is the minimum support that a party needs to obtain in order to be represented. 
Threshold has been invented in order not to make it too easy for small parties to win 
election.
Lijphart describes two kinds of electoral thresholds; legal thresholds and 
district magnitudes. The former is the one provided by the law, either at the national or 
district or regional level. It is defined in terms of gaining a certain number or 
percentage of votes or winning a certain number of seats. For the latter, low district 
magnitudes automatically create high threshold values. They limit the proportionality 
and thus the opportunity for the smaller parties to win a seat. Seeing these two 
thresholds as “the two sides of the same coin," Lijphart converts them into a single 
indicator; “the effective threshold, stated in terms of a percentage of the total national 
vote. “45
Since majoritarian election systems are unfavourable for the small parties, they 
do not need and do not use legal thresholds, the one exception being the 12.5 
percent threshold for access to the second-ballot of France Flowever, because of the 
lowest district magnitudes (mostly single member), Lijphart estimates the effective 
threshold to be about 35 per cent for the majoritarian systems.·^®
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1.2.1V Assembly Size
This is the total number of seats in the legislature. Until Lijphart, none of the scholars 
had studied on the influence of that variable. According to Lijphart's definition of 
electoral systems-as methods of translating votes into seats-the total number of 
seats, i.e. assembly size, available for this translation appears to be "an integral and 
legitimate part" of these systems.' '^  ^Looking at his own example will make things clear; 
If there exist four parties with 41, 29, 17 and 13 per cent of the national vote in a PR 
election and if the election is to a five-member assembly, there is no way of 
maintaining highly proportional results. On the other hand, for a 100-member 
legislative body, a more perfect proportionality could be achieved.·**
In non-PR systems, because the main aim is not being proportional, one can 
think that assembly size does not seem to be an effective variable. However, 
Taagepera has found out that, in plurality elections the degree of disproportionality 
tends to increase while the size of the assemblies decrease.“*5 Given the prevalence of 
single-member districts, the number of districts, which is equal or almost equal to the 
assembly size, is large in all majoritarian election systems.
One more important relationship about the assembly size has been suggested 
and proved by Taagepera: the cube root law of assembly sizes. This law holds that 
assembly size tends to indicate roughly the cube root of the population size.^*
1.2.V Other Variables
Apart from the four major dimensions described above, Lijphart counts four minor, but 
important aspects of electoral systems which are listed below.
Ballot Structure is one of Rae's three basic variables of electoral laws along with the 
formula and district magnitude. All ballots ask the voter to choose among the 
candidates in some way, but they vary in their kinds of choice they demand 
"Categorical ballots" ask the voter to decide which one of the parties he prefers. This 
is the case in most electoral systems. In some cases the voter can make preferences
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among the candidates of a single party, but he cannot divide his mandate among 
parties or among candidates of different parties.
On the other hand, "ordinal ballotd' allow the voter to divide his mandate 
among parties or among candidates of different parties. Single-member district 
plurality systems and the single non-transferrable vote have, by definition, categorical 
ballot structures. The alternative vote and the single transferable vote are ordinal, and 
so is the second ballot of the French majority-plurality system. In most of the PR 
systems, the voters are sometimes allowed to express preferences among candidates 
of the same list but they cannot vote for more than one party list or for candidates of 
different parties.
Malapportionment means that the districts in single-member district systems have 
highly unequal voting populations; and those in multi-member district systems have 
magnitudes that are not proportional to their populations. According to Michael 
Gallagher, malapportionment may systematically favour one or more parties and 
therefore contribute to electoral disproportionality.”
Presidential vs. Parliamentary systems is an important decision with respect to the 
results of the general elections. Matthew Shugart has shown that, presidential 
systems can have an important effect on parliamentary elections if presidential 
elections are by plurality and if parliamentary elections are held at the same time. The 
reason is that since smaller parties do not have much of a chance to have one of their 
candidates elected in the presidential race, largest parties have an advantage which 
tends to carry over into the legislative elections. '^* Therefore, presidential systems have 
a tendency to decrease multipartism.
Linked lists and apparentement is mostly met in PR systems in which voters 
choose among competing party lists. In some of these systems, parties are allowed 
formally to link or connect their lists which means that their combined vote total will be 
used in the initial allocation of seats.
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1.3 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
As far as my studies are concerned, there are two fundamental lines of view about 
how the electoral systems should be treated. The first and most common view is the 
one which regards voting systems as "independent” variables explaining the 
proportionality and party system, the behaviour of politicians, governability, 
accountability, representation of women and minority groups. This group treats the 
electoral systems as the "cause" of some social and political changes. In the next 
view, on the other hand, "the usual perspective is reversed; here the electoral system is 
treated as the dependent, not independent, variable."^  ^ Put in another way, they are taken 
to be in a continuous mutual relationship with these chan'ges. As Bogdanor states, 
"the relationships between electoral systems, party systems and the process of social change 
are reciprocal and highly complex. They cannot be summed up in scientific laws, whether 
those laws are arithmetical, sociological or institutionaf
These two different understandings will be analysed In the rest of that chapter. 
First the views of those scholars, who regard electoral systems an important 
independent factor responsible for the party systems, are presented.
1.3.i Electoral System as "Independent" Variable
The main political consequences of electoral systems on which most of the students 
of electoral systems agree are their effects
* on the proportionality or disproportionality of the electoral outcomes;
* on the party system, that is, the multipartism and the tendency to generate 
majority victories;
* on the nature of parties, that is, on party discipline and on the relationships 
between the representatives and constituents.
* on representation of v/omen and minority groups;
* on accountability;
* on governability;
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1.3.i.a DISPROPORTIONALITY
Political equality is one of the main tenets of modern democratic theory. Accordingly, 
no voter should be formally be allocated an influence greater than others. Following 
that line of thinking, proportionality is an inescapable condition of political equality. 
Across the country the percentage of seats awarded to a party should reflect its 
percentage share of the national vote for each party. When this definition is 
considered, it is impossible for any electoral system to produce exactly proportional 
results due to the fact that parliaments have a given number of seats and the seat 
shares given to the different parties can never be made equal to their vote shares. 
Disproportionality, thus, means the deviation of parties' seat shares from their vote 
shares. Though all general systems tend to be disproportionaF^ the degrees of 
disproportionality leads to important implications.
There are different ways (indices) to measure disproportionality.According to 
Lijphart's recent findings, where he uses "Least Squares (LSq) method", the degree of 
disproportionality ranges from a low value of 0.67% in Malta to a very high value of 
20.77% in India.^’
Below, the influences of first the electoral formula (hence disproportionality), 
next the effective threshold value and lastly the assembly size, on proportionality will 
be observed.
Influence of Electoral Formula
Lijphart has calculated that two-thirds of the variance in disproportionality is explained 
by the electoral system alone.®®
The average index of disproportionality for the 7 plurality systems is 13.56%, 
and for the 5 majority-plurality systems 10.88%. While the 32 PR systems with the 
d'Hondt and Largest-remainders-Imperiali formulas make an average index of only 
5.22%, 13 PR systems using Largest-remainders-Droop, STV and modified Sainte- 
Lagu§ formulas performs 4.15%, and finally, 12 PR formulas using Largest- 
remainders-Hare method 1.88%. (See Table 1.1)
Electoral formula Disproportionality (%)
Plurality (7) 13.56
Majority-plurality (5) 10.88
d’Hondt, Imperiali (32) 5.22
Droop, STV and Sainte-Lague (13; 4.15
Hare (12) 1.88
Source: Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1994),
p. 96.
Note: The number of cases on which the average numbers an percentages are based are in parentheses.
The percentages in the first column of Table 1.1 indicates that, although all of 
the electoral systems are disproportional, there exists huge differences among the 
various systems and the PR systems perform better proportionality than the non-PR 
ones. Among the PR formulas, on the other hand. Highest averages formulas have 
more tendency to disproportionality than the largest remainders formulas. In the 
former group Sainte-Lagu6 seems to be more proportional (than d’Hondt), and in the 
latter group Hare method have the least tendency to disproportionality.
However, the only reason behind the more disproportionality of the plurality 
systems is not the formula or in Duvergei^s terminology "mechanical factor"^ .^ The 
“psychological factori' strengthens the mechanical one. To put it in another way, in 
plurality systems voters realise that their votes are wasted if they continue giving them 
to minor parties (with little chance of winning) and cast their votes for larger parties. 
This leads to more disproportional results. However, as Lijphart mentions PR does 
not have such a restraining influence on minor parties.®^
Influence of Effective Threshold
The two main dimensions, other than the formula, of the electoral systems were 
district magnitudes and effective thresholds. As the effective threshold value is heavily 
dependant upon the district magnitudes, for the sake of simplicity I gathered them 
under the heading of the latter.
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Effective threshold (%) Dispropoitionality (%)
35 (12) 12.44
12.9-18.8(9) 7.24
8.0-11.7(13) 5.74
4.0-5.9(17) 3.68
0.1-3.3(18) 2.29
Source: Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p,99.
Note: The number o f cases on which the average numbers an percentages are based are in parentheses.
Table 2.2 displays the influences of effective threshold (first column) on the 
disproportionality (second column). The first category is consisted of all plurality, 
majoritarian systems (having small district magnitudes) and some PR (having large 
constituencies, hence highest threshold values) systems. All the other four categories 
are consisted from different PR systems.
One can see that, while the systems having higher threshold values, and lower 
district magnitudes also show higher disproportionality rates, with the decrease in 
threshold values (or increase in district magnitudes) the disproportionality rates 
reduce uniformly.
For instance, the countries having nation-wide, that is largest districts, or two- 
tier districting-Austria, Denmark, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, etc- have lower 
values of effective threshold and hence lower rates (index) of disproportionality.
Influence of Assembly Size
The fourth dimension of the electoral systems was the assembly size. According to 
Lijphart's finding the percentage of disproportionality decreases monotonously, from 
4.86% to 3.63%, as assembly size increases.
To summarise, it can be said that, besides the influence of effective threshold 
and assembly size, the rate of proportionality is heavily affected by the electoral 
formula. While PR systems give the highest indices of proportionality, for the plurality 
systems this criteria is clearly unfavourable.
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1.3.i.b PARTY SYSTEMS
According to a conventional wisdom in political science, single-member district 
plurality systems favour two-party systems^, and conversely, PR and two-ballot 
systems encourage multipartism. This proposition is linked to another main argument 
that the party systems could be shaped by playing with the electoral system. Some 
political scientists even claimed that PR is a danger for democracies, parallel to 
Ferdinand Mermens, who blamed PR as the essential factor within the breakdown of 
the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler.
Lijphart questions this conventional thinking by means of focusing on two 
major party system characteristics, multipartism in terms of the effective number of 
elective parties and the effective number of parliamentary parties^ ,^ and majority 
victories, by measuring the tendency of the electoral system to generate parliamentary 
majorities and the tendency to generate manufactured majorities^T
The same kind of study--according to the influential factors- developed for the 
disproportionality of the systems will be repeated here.
Influence of Electoral Formula and Disproportionalitv
The second and third columns of Table 1.3 shows that there is a great difference 
between plurality and d'Hondt-type PR systems : the average effective numbers of 
elective and parliamentary parties in the former are 3.09 and 2.04, and in the latter 
are 4.35 and 3.70. In the second group of majoritarian systems (including Australia 
(alternative voting), French Fifth Republic (double ballot), etc.) the same variables- 
3.58 and 2.77, respectively-fall in between the plurality and the PR systems.
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Table 1.3. The effects of electoral formulas on disproport tonality and party systems in 69 electoral 
systems.
Electoral
fomuila
Disprop.
(%)
Nfe) Nfpl F(pm) Frmm)
Plur. (7) 13.56 3.09 2.04 0.93 0.71
Maj. (5) 10.88 3.58 2.77 0.52 0.52
d’Hondt (32) 5.22 4.35 3.70 0.18 0.14
Droop 4.15 3.80 3.29 0.24 0.14
Hare 1.88 3.94 3.34 0.30 0.21
Source: Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p. 96.
Abbreviations. Plur: Plurality systems; Maj: majority-plurality systems; d'Hondt: d’Hondt and Largest- 
remainders-Imperiali formulas; Droop; Largest-remainders-Droop, STV an modified Sainte-Lague 
systems; Hare: Largest-remainders-Hare formula; Disprop: Disproportionality ratio; N(e); effective 
niunber of elective parties; N(p); Effective number of parliamentary parties; F(p); Frequency of 
parliamentary majorities; F(m); Frequency of manufactured majorities.
Note: The number of cases on which the average numbers an percentages are based are in parentheses.
The difference in the numbers of elective parties between the plurality and 
majoritarian systems-3.09 and 3,58-comes from DuvergeFs psychological factor. 
This factor is not very influential in French double ballot system, as the voters can vote 
for their favourite small party in the first round without the fear of wasting their votes. 
Again, in the alternative vote of Australia, a first preference to a weak party does not 
mean that the vote is wasted. On the other hand, in Britain, the so-called 
psychological factor is heavily influential because of the reason that a vote for a 
minority party (or for the Liberal Democrats) is believed to be a wasted vote.
More importantly, the second and third columns of Table 1.3 also show that, 
contrary to the expectations, when the outcomes become more proportional, the 
number of parties (either effective or parliamentary) does not increase: the least 
proportional d'Hondt formula has the most parties, and the most proportional largest- 
remainders-Hare has the fewest.
Another consequence of the electoral systems, which is clearly seen in Table 
1.3, is that all of them reduces the effective number of elected parties while the seats 
are allocated at the parliament. The average number of effective parliamentary parties
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(column 3) is smaller than the average number of electoral parties (column 2). 
Although this reduction is common for all electoral laws, I calculated it to be stronger 
in plurality and majority systems than in PR systems: the average rate of reduction in 
the 7 plurality systems is found to be a very high score of 33 98% when compared 
with the most proportional largest-remainders-Hare systems' 4.41% reduction rate. 
The reduction rates of majority-plurality and semi-proportional systems and other least 
proportional PR formulas, 22.62%, 14.94% and 13.42%, respectively, fall in between 
the two extremes. It can be concluded, thus, that the reduction in the number of 
parties is mainly a function of the disproportionality of the electoral system.*®
For the case of majority victories Table 1.3 displays that there is an important 
correlation between the disproportionality of the systems and the existence or absence 
of parliamentary majorities and/or manufactured majorities. The plurality systems 
having the largest disproportionality rates, are associated with the parliamentary 
majorities. That is, in 92% of these systems a party gains the majority, whether 
manufactured or earned, of the parliament. This ratio decreases to 52% in the 
majoritarian systems, and approximately 20% in different PR formulas. However, 71% 
of the majorities gained in plurality systems and 52% of them gained in majoritarian 
systems are manufactured while the same rate is very low for the PR systems. In the 
largest-remainders-Hare systems only 4% of the majorities (though they are very rare) 
are manufactured. In short, while the capacity of creating majorities is strong in 
plurality and majoritarian systems, mostly these majorities are not earned but 
manufactured. Lijphart sees the PR systems as the vital element of consensus 
democracy for their smallest rates of manufactured majorities.
Influence of Effective Threshold
Table 1.4 shows the influence of effective threshold on the party system 
characteristics. Correspondingly, first, the effective number of parties increase as the 
threshold decreases; secondly, as the threshold decreases the frequency of 
parliamentary majorities and/or manufactured majorities also goes down.
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Effective 
threshold (%)
N(ej Nip) F(pm) F^mm)
35112) 3.30 2.34 0.76 0.63
12.9-18.8 f9) 3.28 2.71 0.61 0.38
8.0-11.7(13) 3.99 3.31 0.25 0.18
4.0-5.9(17) 4.56 3.99 0.05 0.04
0.1-3.3(18) 4.07 3.74 0.11 0.03
Source: Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p. 99.
Abbreviations. N(e): Effective number o f  elective parties; N(p): Effective number o f  parliamentary 
parties; F(p): Frequency o f  parliamentary majorities; F(m): Frequency o f  manufactured majorities.
Note: The number o f  cases on which the average numbers an percentages are based are in parentheses.
Influence of Assembly Size
While studying the influence of the assembly size we noted that the assembly size 
and proportionality are directly related. Accordingly, one could expect that, in smaller 
assemblies, lower number of effective parties and higher frequencies of manufactured 
majorities. However, Lijphart's findings show that this is not the case™. Therefore, 
effect of the assembly size on party system structure is the weakest.
Concludingly, the relation between the electoral formula and the party system 
is much weaker than the one between the electoral formula and disproportionality. 
While the influence of the electoral system on the effective number of elective parties 
is weaker, for the effective number of parliamentary parties, the link is a bit stronger. 
On the other hand, the effective threshold is very influential: The higher the threshold 
the higher the frequency of parliamentary majorities (see Table 1.4).
The most important conclusion, therefore, is that multipartism (or two-party 
system) is not caused only by PR (or by plurality system), but many other intervening 
variables-such as Duvergefs psychological factor, effective thresholds, the mutual 
relationship^! between the electoral and party systems-exist.
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1.3.I.C NATURE OF PARTIES
The effects of an electoral system allowing voters to choose between candidates as 
well as parties and of another allowing only between parties are different. In those 
countries allowing choice of candidates, such as Ireland, Japan and Italy, party 
disciplines are weaker and correspondingly the politics of brokerage and clientelism is 
seen to be operating'^ ,^ even within the candidates of the same party,alongside the 
usual party competition.
Another differentiation, influencing the nature of parties, takes place between 
the systems using single-member constituencies and those using multi-member 
constituencies. In simple-plurality system with single-member constituencies 
personal characteristics of the candidates seem to be much more important than the 
party programmes. As Butler notes, for instance, in United States, a congressman's 
fate depends only marginally on his party’s fortunes. There, the primaries weaken the 
party ties too.
On the other hand, in list-PR systems the party oligarchy decides who are 
going to be put into the list. What is more, the voters vote for the parties, not for the 
candidates. Therefore, the party discipline is very strong and the relationships 
between elected members and their constituents are the weakest under these 
systems.
1.3.l.d REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN AND MINORITY GROUPS
Representation of different viewpoints is also an important aspect of democracy. 
According to that view the legislatures should be socially representative, "reflecting in 
its composition the distribution of voters as a whole across social classes, genders, 
ethnic groups, or regions.
Accordingly, many students of electoral studies focus on the fact that there is a 
strong linkage between women's legislative representation and the nature of the 
electoral system. PR appears to be favouring higher levels of female representation
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as the political parties have an incentive to place women on their respective lists to 
broaden their appeal.
In single-member districts, however, because only one person is elected, 
political party leaders or strategists have a disincentive to risk supporting a woman 
candidate. For example, in Germany where one-half of the parliament is chosen in 
single-member constituencies and the other half in large PR districts, the researches 
proved that on the latter ones, over twice as many women are elected from the single­
member districts. Russia adopted a version of this electoral arrangement for its first 
multiparty election in December 1993 and the women candidates were elected to 
13.5% of Russia's lowerhouse seats7’
STV, on the other hand, gives benefit to women candidates if compared to 
plurality and majority systems.
The same argument applies to candidates representing ethnic, racial or 
regional minorities. In the single-member plurality or majoritarian systems, Bogdanor 
points out the fact that, parties will seek to avoid hurting the prejudices of the majority 
of the electorate.·^* It is for this reason that women and members of minority groups 
are not so much successful under such systems.
Another consequence highly related to that argument is the handling of social 
(mostly ethnic) conflicts. As the ethnic divisions have emerged again nowadays, 
confronting those conflicts has been a very important factor. Accordingly, the electoral 
systems, either strengthen or discourage cleavages based on race, tribe, religion, 
culture, language, etc. As mentioned above, plurality systems do not give any minor 
group the chance of winning and thus, do not reflect those social cleavages on the 
legislative body. However, this leads to greater conflicts.
PR systems, on the other hand, obtain a fair representation of different views in 
the parliament, and thus discourage the emergence of social conflicts.
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1.3.i.e ACCOUNTABILITY
The basic underlying idea here is that "voting method should foster representatives' 
behaviour which can be monitored and judged by voters."*®
According to that definition, accountability could most easily be maintained in 
plurality and majority-plurality systems as it is very easy, in the single-member 
electoral districts, for the voters to monitor their (the district's) representative.Thus, 
it is a generally accepted rule that the accountability of representatives is a favourable 
criteria for the plurality systems, whereas in PR systems (especially list-PR), voters 
may not even know who their representative is until the end of the elections. *2
1.3.i.f GOVERNABILITY
The electoral system can influence-either by worsening or by helping-the governing 
of a society. The generally accepted view, in Lijphart's terminology; majoritarian view^ ,^ 
is that, majority and single-party governments are the ones that could sustain the 
governability principle, for a legislative program can be easily enacted in those 
systems. The executive will be stable and effective as it is consisted of a single party, 
instead of a coalition of parties with different interests, short lifetimes, thus, unstable 
cabinets. According to this majoritarian view, the program of the winning party will be 
the government's program and can easily be applied. To summarise what we have 
said, according to the majoritarians, plurality electoral systems, by resulting two-party 
systems, appear to sustain highest degree of governability and stability.*'*
However, there is a strong counter-argument, coming from the defenders (the 
prominent figure being Arend Lijphart) of the consensus model of democracy. Of 
course, this is not the place for the study of majoritarian vs. consensus democracy 
models, however, it should be noted that, Lijphart has shown that majoritarian 
parliamentary systems do not have a better record with regard to macro-economic 
management, maintenance of the public order and peace than the multi-party 
parliamentary systems.*^ For instance, governability and stability are perfectly
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obtained in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, both having PR type of electoral 
systems with multiparties, and without single-party majorities.
Also, in contrast to the former model's (majoritarian) tendency to concentrate 
executive power in one party and bare-majority cabinets, in the consensus model 
parties generally share executive power in a broad coalition. Therefore, alliances are 
encouraged under that model and its most favoured electoral system, PR. By means 
of these alliances, "adversary (over-polarised) politics" is avoided.^®
Other than the PR systems, both the second ballot and the alternative vote 
seek to prevent any candidate from being elected on a minority vote and therefore 
encourage alliances between parties.
1,3.ii Electoral System as "Dependent” Variable
As explained earlier, according to the next view the electoral system is treated as a 
dependent variable, which have complex relationships with the political changes. 
According to Bogdanor, the electoral system is influenced by the political traditions of 
the countries in which they operate.^’ Thus, as Butler rightly warns, one should be 
sceptical about attributing fixed qualities to electoral systems.**
The same electoral system can have quite dissimilar effects in different 
countries; or even in the same country at different periods of its history. Below this 
view will be supported with a number of examples from the experiences of countries 
which have different electoral systems.
To begin with plurality systems, Butler states that, seven countries, have had 
very different experiences and results with simple plurality elections.*’ In Canada, 
where plurality system is in use, between 1957 and 1980, six out of ten elections have 
failed to produce majority parties. This proves the invalidity of the argument saying 
"first-past-the post elections produce clear majorities." More interestingly, the 
consequence has not been a coalition government but a minority government. Thus, 
Canada also refutes the thesis that only majority governments are strong.
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Another case is witnessed within the same country: While the plurality system 
have produced moderate government in Britain between 1945 and late 60s, since 
then and especially after the strengthening of the Liberal Democrats, it has been seen 
by many as a de-stabilising factor and blamed for Britain's economic decline.
For the two-ballot system, Goldey and Williams found that it had different 
political consequences at different periods (in Third and Fifth Republics) and in a new 
social and political context the same mechanism could operate in a quite different
way. 91
Like these, PR systems-even the same formulas-have resulted differently in 
different countries or in the same country within different periods. For example, it is a 
common view that PR has contributed to the rise of Hitler during the Weimar period’ ,^ 
and to a polarised and unstable democracy in Italy. But when the social and political 
contexts, belonging to Germany and Italy, are observed, it can be understood that 
these criticisms are unjust.
First of all, the party system inherited with the new electoral system of the 
Weimar period (PR) is believed to have fragmented the party system. However, the 
election results show that the number of parliamentary parties was not much greater 
than the preceding Imperial period.
Next, what had happened in the transition from Imperial to Weimar period was 
not a change in the party system but within the constitution. Therefore, while the 
parties in the former were required only to represent and not govern, under the latter 
regime, they were expected to govern according to the responsible government 
tradition. And, naturally their failure to operate a parliamentary system were seen as a 
consequence of the new electoral system®“*
The third evidence is that a very similar system, used in Czechoslovakia 
throughout the interwar period, served to enhance democracy rather than 
undermining it. Again, the Danish Nazis, even under the German occupation, could 
only secure 2.2% of the total vote in 1943.®^
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While both in Italy and Scandinavian countries proportional systems are used, 
the consequences in the two systems are very different. The former one is an ideal 
case in which instability is witnessed frequently, whereas the latter one is sufficient to 
prove that PR systems do not always lead to political weakness and instability.
The importance of the social and political context can also be seen in the semi­
proportional systems. In Ireland and Japan for instance, although one might predict 
candidate-based political outcomes instead of centralised party control, because of 
the conservative political culture in those countries, the outcomes are as much party- 
based as candidate-based.That is, in a different culture, the political effects of the 
same systems would be very differerit. In Australia, for example, at the Senate where 
STV is used for the election of the representatives, the behaviour of the voters 
contrast with the generalisations about the STV. That is, the candidate-based policies 
did not work out and in thirty-two years, there have never been enough individual 
voters to change the party-lists.^*
Recent Developments
In the 1990s, a number of democracies (both established and new-emerging ones) 
reformed their electoral systems. Interestingly, the changes neither took the direction 
of PR nor of plurality systems. New Zealand, from the extreme of majoritarian systems, 
Italy from the opposite extreme (that of PR), and Japan, from the semi-proportional 
group, shifted their systems towards the two-tier districted system (or additional 
member system, AMS) used in Germany. This AMS system has also attracted 
considerable support from the reformers in Britain and in Israel-other extremes of the 
plurality and PR systems.^’
My aim in mentioning these recent developments is to show that all the 
electoral systems, from the most majoritarian through highly proportional, are 
dependent on the social context in which they operate. A system, which we might 
scientifically evaluate as giving "stable", or "proportional", or "accountable" results, is 
also in a complex relation with cultural and socio-economic variables of the country it
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is used and thus, may give some other contrasting consequences which are not in 
parallel to our evaluations.
 ^ International Encyclopedia o f  Social Sciences. 1st ed. (1968), s.v. "Electoral Systems," by Stein Rokkan.
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 ^ Ibid., p. 7.
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Chapter
2
Turkish Electoral History
(pre-1980)
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Turkey is one of the few developing countries with a relatively long tradition of free and 
competitive elections^ In that chapter the history of elections in Turkey will be 
reviewed within the time period between late 18th century and 1980 military 
intervention.
2.1 REFORM PERIOD and TANZİMAT
Even before the adoption of electoral systems, the notion of representation had a 
significant place in the Ottoman history. As Ozbudun states, it was an "established 
custom" for Ottoman governments to have "an assembly of civil, military and religious 
officials" to discuss the important problems.^ For instance, according to Davison, 
Sultan Selim III had used that kind of a general or consultative assembly to discuss 
the reform measures. ^  Although this was not a representative body, it was an 
evidence for the fact that important policy decisions were based on consultations in a 
large council.
Next, in 1808 a special assembly of provincial notables was convened in 
Istanbul and the Deed of Alliance (Sened-i İttifak), a document which defined the 
mutual obligations of the central government and provincial notables against each 
other, was prepared.
Mahmut II had institutionalised the notion of "consultative assembly" under the 
name of Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (meclis-i vala-yi ahkam-i adliye). 
The Imperial Rescript of Rosechamber (Gülhane Hatti Hümayunu) proclaimed in 1839 
by the next sultan, Abdülmecid I, strengthened that institution. The responsibility of 
that council was to discuss and prepare new regulations and laws by free discussion 
on matters of civil rights and taxation. Though all prepared drafts of regulations 
needed the approval of the sultan, Abdülmecid promised that he woüld accept the 
drafts if they were decided by majority of the members of the council. Later a "quasi- 
parliamentary" procedure, without a representative or responsible government, has 
been adopted for the council. The council has even been characterised as a "de facto
: !
legislative" as a result of the approval, by the Sultan, of nearly 90 percent of its 
recommendations.
Ozbudun obsen/es the development of representative institutions during the 
Tanzimat period in two ways: First, the important role of the central legislative councils 
has increased, and second local administrative councils based on elections (limited) 
have been established. ^
In 1854, the supreme council has been divided into two subcouncils, 
legislative and judicial.^ In 1868, a legislative body, the Council of State {§ura-yi 
Devlef), including members from various religious communities (millets) and social 
classes was created.W ith the Council of State, also the principle of representation 
was expanded to include representatives of different classes and nationalities. Thus 
nominations for membership were asked and received from the provincial governors, 
from municipal officials of the larger cities and from the heads of the millets and guilts.
Though this was a representation not based on elections, the notion that 
major social groups and classes of the empire should be represented in its central 
legislative council and have a say on the law-making process was an important 
development.
The second line of development was the establishment of local (provincial) 
administrative councils created in 1840, to check the actions of the governors. These 
councils also permitted the representation of non-Muslim communities by their local 
religious authorities. The Muslims, on the other hand were represented by officials and 
local notables. The elections to these administrative councils were first tested in 
Danube(Tuna) province and in and extended to the rest of the country in 1867.*
The electoral system was a complex one in which, centrally appointed officials 
had a considerable say over the election of members. In the councils of subprovinces 
(sancak) and districts (kaza) the local leaders of non-Muslim communities 
automatically had seats. The elected members were two Muslims and two non- 
Muslims on the province (vilayet) and subprovince councils and three members 
(religion unspecified) on the districts. The election of these members was not a direct
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one as they were elected by the councils of elders of each religious community. 
However, the election of these councils of elders was done, each year, in a direct 
manner, i.e. by all Ottoman subjects of the locality who were taxpayers’  and were over 
eighteen years old. Also, there were the general assemblies of each province with 
advisory powers. They were composed of four representatives from each subprovince, 
two Muslims and two non-Muslims. But these provincial general assemblies were 
unable to come together, except for their meeting at the beginning of the system.*®
Despite its shortcomings the provincial law of 1864 introduced the elective 
principle into Ottoman local administration.
2.2 CONSTITUTIONALIST PERIODS
The idea of a national representative assembly had not developed in the Tanzimat 
period. The first Ottoman parliament, the one chamber of the bicameral Ottoman 
legislature,** based on elections came into being with the constitution of 1876. But 
before the promulgation of the constitution. Midhat Pasa, the leader of the 
constitutionalist group, prepared a provisional electoral law, in order to gather a 
parliament.*2 It was followed by, an electoral regulation (Talimat-i Muvakkate) was 
promulgated on October 28, 1876, while the constitution which was still being 
debated in the drafting committee.
The constitution contained no provision, either on the system of election, 
except for stating the secrecy of ballot, or on the eligibility to vote, except for limiting it 
to males. The regulation, however, established an "indirect" system of voting, the 
deputies were to be elected by the members of the administrative councils of the 
provinces, subprovinces and districts. Midhat Pasa, wishing to gather a parliament as 
soon as possible, saw this method as the most practical one.
This provisional regulation fixed the number of deputies at 130 (80 of them 
Muslims, and 50 non-Muslims) and restricted eligibility to those who owned some 
property, whose age was not below 27 and who knew Turkish.*^
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The electoral formula for the election of the national assembly of the Ottoman 
Empire was a "simple-plurality" formula.
Despite the limited and indirect suffrage and some interference in the electoral 
process by the provincial governors, it is agreed that the first legislative elections in the 
Ottoman Empire produced a Chamber of Deputies broadly representative of various 
national and religious communities and social classes. Although the Muslims had a 
majority in the Chamber, the Christians and the Jews were proportionally much better 
represented; and Turks were a minority of the deputies, sharing the Muslim seats with 
the Arabs, Kurds, Albanians and Bosnians. About this first Chamber of Deputies, 
Robert Devereux states that the Chamber was the mosaic of the empire; that is the 
deputies represented every social and economic stratum of the empire, every religious 
community and every ethnic and linguistic group.
The first session of the Chamber of Deputies came to an end on June 28, 
1877. Although the new elections for the second session should have been done 
under a new law passed by the Chamber, since the bill had not become a law until the 
end of the first session, the elections for the second session were also held under the 
provisional regulation (Talimat-i Muvakkate) mentioned above. However, the second 
session of the Chamber did not last so long as it has been abolished by Sultan 
Abdulhamid in 1878. Correspondingly, the Chamber of Deputies was not convened 
until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.
The first elections of the second constitutional period were held in 1908 and 
the electoral law {Intihab-i Mebusan Kanunu) which had been passed by the first 
Chamber of Deputies, though had not then become effective, was applied. While the 
electoral formula had stayed the same, i.e. simple plurality, the condition of being 
eligible to vote was to be a male, and to be a tax payer. The system was again indirect 
in the sense that primary voters were to choose secondary voters (one secondary 
voter for the first 750 primary electors, and another secondary elector for the additional 
500 primary).!^
40
The most important point of the elections of the second constitutionalist period 
(1908, 1912, and 1914) is that, they were the first elections in which political parties 
competed. In 1908, for instance, there were three parties competing: Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP), Young Turks, and the Liberal Party. CUP won the 
elections. All the elements within the empire were fairly well represented and satisfied 
by their representation. Out of 288 deputies, there were 147 Turks, 60 Arabs, 26 
Greeks, 14 Albanians, 10 Slavs and 4 Jews.**
After that election of 1908, during the second constitutional period, two more 
elections had taken place in 1912 and in 1914. Although those two elections had 
taken place under the conditions of governmental pressure and manipulation,*® that 
period of 1905-18 provided the first extended Turkish experiment with competitive 
elections, organised political parties and parliamentary processes. Thus, the first 
seeds of mass politics in Turkey are blossomed in this period.
2.3 THE NATIONAL LIBERATION and THE SINGLE-PARTY ERA
The two elections held during the War of National Liberation had a special 
significance since they marked the beginnings of the new Turkish state. The 1919 
elections were the last elections to the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies. The elections 
were dominated by the Defence of Rights associations (MCidafa-i Hukuk cemiyetleri). 
However, the new chamber did not have a long life and came to an end with the 
occupation of Istanbul by the Allied forces.
After the occupation of Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal sent telegrams to the 
provincial authorities and army commanders, instructing them to hold elections for the 
assembly to be convened in Ankara. In the instruction (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafa-i 
Hukuk Cemiyeti Namına Intihab Hakkında Tebliğ), the electoral formula was replaced 
by an "absolute majority" formula.^® Although the elections of 1920 were again 
dominated by the Defence of Rights associations, they seem to have been open and 
honest.-* As a result, the first Grand National Assembly (GNA) is convened with the 
representatives elected this way.
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However, GNA, had insisted on using the old law of 1908, which accepted the 
simple plurality formula as a fundamental principle and five of the six elections of the 
single-party regime (1923, 1927, 1931, 1935, and 1939) took place under that law. In 
December 14, 1942 the first electoral law (Law No: 4320) of the Turkish Republic had 
been enacted.^2 Interestingly, this law had again accepted the single-plurality formula 
as the basis of the electoral system. To sum up, all of the six elections of the single­
party period, adding the last one of 1943, were made under the simple-plurality 
formula. As the provinces were taken as the electoral constituencies, the system 
worked as simple-plurality in multi-member districts.
Another common characteristic of all these six elections was, naturally, their 
non-competitive character. In fact, during that period, there were two brief experiments 
with more than one party^, but both experiments were quickly ended, and no 
legislative election took place during their lifetimes.
In all of these six non-competitive elections, the provisions of the 1908 
Ottoman Law, which had provided for indirect (two-stage) elections, explained above, 
were applied. However during "that time there were some important changes: first, the 
taxpaying requirement for the electors (either first or second) has been abolished and 
the age limit had been reduced to 18 in 1923.
Then in 1930, women were given the right to vote in municipal elections and in 
1934 women were candidates eligible to become primary or secondary electors or 
deputies in the legislative elections. The same law raised the minimum voting age to 
22 for both males and females.
At the beginning, in these elections, nomination by the RPP automatically 
meant election to the GNA, and nominations were controlled by the top leadership of 
the party. As the top leadership positions, such as vice-presidentship and the 
secretary general post were also appointed by the president of the republic, the 
influence of the president was dominant. By the election of 1931, however, some 
attempts were made to open up the nomination process to a certain degree: For 
instance, names of the prospective nominees were chosen from all parts of the
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country. Also the party leadership decided to leave some vacant seats (30 in 1931) so 
that the voters could elect independent candidates. The same procedure was 
continued in 1935 for sixteen seats and in 1939 for four seats.^^
In 1939 there was a new practice: RPP made consultations with the second 
electors of the 28 provinces before the announcement of the party lists, and in 1943 
elections, RPP nominated 530 candidates for 458 deputyships, these living on degree 
of choice to the second electors.
The most striking development came in the by- elections of 1945. In the six 
provinces, where the elections took place, for the first time in its history. RPP did not 
nominate any candidates. Accordingly, both the number of candidates has increased 
and the nature of elections (campaign strategies) changed. Following that positive 
development, there came the famous speech of President İnönü stating that there 
was the need for an opposition party and that the next elections would take place on a 
single-stage.
Before concluding this part a question should be asked; What was the 
significance of the one-party elections in Turkey, as they can not be regarded as 
democratic because of non-competitiveness and the heavy influence of single-party 
on candidate nominations? Juan Linz says that "if there are elections they must have 
some functions for the leadership and some consequences for the political system 
and the voters must have some reason to participate in them."^’ Ozbudun argues 
that the significance of these non-competitive elections derives from their function; 
This function is that, by helping to maintain the belief that the regime's legitimacy 
derived from popular majorities obtained at elections, these elections created a climate 
of opinion favourable to a transition to democratic politics. 2*
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2.4 COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS 
2.4.11946-60 Period
The first competitive elections during the Republican period took place in July 1946T** 
Though a new law was enacted by the GNA^o in place of the previous one, this new 
law was not containing the fundamental changes needed. The most important change 
it brought was the abolishment of the indirect (two-stage) elections, and the adoption 
of "direct" (one stage) elections. The electoral formula was not changed, i.e. it stayed 
as the simple-plurality formula.
In the election of 1946, the newly formed Democrat Party (DP) has got 62 
seats and the Republican People's Party (RPP) 396. As the Democrats claimed that 
large-scale electoral fraud and manipulation has taken place during the elections and 
the 1946-50 period, further démocratisation of the electoral laws was the main item 
debated. Until the enactment of the new law, DP did not compete in the local and by 
elections that took place during that era.^  ^ Finally the electoral reforms pressed by the 
Democrats were accepted and a new electoral law^  ^was enacted in February 1950.
Although the new electoral law passed in 1950 introduced the secret ballot, 
open counting, and sorting of ballots and a system of judicial supervision of electoral 
administration, it did not change the electoral formula.” Accordingly, each of the 64 
(later 67) provinces, into which the country was divided, served as a constituency. And 
the magnitudes of these constituencies are determined according to their 
populations. A province, thus, elected one member if its population was under 55000 
and one additional member for each additional 40000 inhabitants. Of course, the total 
number of parliamentary seats were to be adjusted before each election, in 
accordance with the rise in the population. Indeed, the assembly size has increased 
from 487 in 1950 to 602 in 1957.”  The voters were given the right to vote for one or 
more candidates, upto the number of seats their constituency had. The candidates 
with the greatest number of votes in each constituency were declared elected. As the 
vast majority of the voters preferred voting for a party list (without making preferences), 
the candidates being in the list of the party gaining the plurality of the votes were
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elected. Shortly, the electoral system was a simple plurality system in multi-member 
constituencies with the party lists.
In the elections of May 14 1950, held under the new law, Democrat Party won
53.3 percent of the popular vote and 83.8 percent of assembly seats, and on the other 
hand RPP gained 39.8 percent of the votes and 14.2 percent of the seats. The 
elections of 1954 and 1957 were again held under the same electoral law.
Table 2.1 displays the percentages of votes and seats won by the political 
parties in the parliamentary elections behween 1950 and 1957, that is in 1950, 1954 
and in 1957 elections.
Year DP RPP NP FP
1950 53.3 39.8 3 .0 -
(83.8) (14.2) (0 .2 )
1954 56.6 34.8 4 .8 -
(91.6) (5.6) (0 .9 )
1957 47.3 40.6 7.0 3.8
________c m - .  . (28 .7) _______ (2:1)________
Source: Milletvekili Genel ve Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Üctebir Yenileme Secimi Sonuçlan (The 
Restüts o f  the National Assem bly General Elections and the Elections for Renewal o f  One-Third o f  the 
Senate Membership) (Ankara: T.C.Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yayini, 1977), pp. 2-25.
Note. The first figure refers to the percentage o f  votes and the figure in parentheses to the percentage o f  
seats. Totals m ay not add to 100 because o f  the omission o f  the independents.
Abbreviations: D P-Dem ocrat Party; RPP-Republican People’s Party; N P-N ation  Party; FP-Freedom  
Party.
While studying the previous periods, we were not interested in the political 
consequences of the electoral formula because the single-party domination was the all 
important element in politics. However, when the competitive elections are 
concerned, the characteristics of the electoral formula, becomes important. Between 
1950 and 1957, the system in use, that is, simple-plurality system in multi-member 
constituencies, resulted unbelievable ratios of disproportionality.^* Indeed, the average 
index of disproportionality in these three elections (see Table 2.2) is 26.35%^· ,^ 
remarkably higher when compared to the average disproportionality of the 7 plurality
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systems throughout the world^*, 13.56%. Especially the disproportionality index of the 
1954 election, 32.24%, is highest of ail times. In the same elections while DP has 
been 35% over-represented, RPP, on the other side has been 29.2% 
underrepresented.
Table 2.2 indices o f  disproportionality and effective number o f  parties, 1950-1957
Election Y ear DispropoitionaHty Effective Number o f  Parties
(% ) N(e) N (p)
1950 28.22 2,25 1.38
1954 32.34 2.25 1.18
1957 18.50 ' 2.53 1.76
Average 26.35 2.34 1.44
Note. TTie methods o f  measuring "disproportionality" (Least Squares method) and "effective number o f  
parties" are taken from Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A  Study o f  Twenty-Seven 
Democracies. 1945-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 57-62 and pp. 67-72.
Abbreviations: N (e)-effective number o f  electoral parties; N (p)-effective number o f  parliamentary 
parties.
As seen above. Table 2.2 also displays the effective number of parties (based 
both on parties' vote shares and seat shares). In parallel with our findings in the first 
chapter, the electoral system reduced the effective number of elective parties while the 
seats are being allocated at the parliament. Looking at the number of parliamentary 
parties, one can conclude that the political system was not even a two-party system, 
a common aspect of the plurality systems.^’  Another measure which we defined in 
the previous chapter was the electoral system's tendency to generate parliamentary 
majorities. When the seat shares of the political parties are observed in Table 2.1, it is 
clear that all of the elections of that period have generated parliamentary majorities, 
two of them (1950, 1954) earned, and the last one manufactured.
However, as Rustow rightly points, this majorities, created disproportionately, 
"encouraged his party's [Adnan Menderes' DP] tendency toward dictatorship."^®
Especially after the very disproportional results of the 1957 elections, the RPP 
and the minor opposition parties criticised the DP leaders for their dictatorial
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tendencies and blamed the multimember, simple-plurality system, which produced 
that unfair parliamentary majorities.
Nevertheless, as Ozbudun argues, "when further aggravation of the political 
crisis finally led to the military take-over of 1960, the intellectual public opinion was 
ready to change the electoral system into proportional representation.
One can conclude that, despite its highly disproportional electoral formula and, 
its violent ending, the 1946-60 period constituted an important phase in the 
institutionalisation of competitive elections in Turkey.
2.4.Ü 60s and 70s
The shortcomings of the electoral system used before the 1960 military intervention, 
heavily influenced the constitutional reform debates, taking place between the 
advocates of the proportional system and those of the majoritarian system, after the 
overthrow of Adnan Menderes in 1960.
Pro-PR politicians and political scientists mentioned that since 1876, the 
simple plurality system in use, caused two parties to get stronger and no one else. 
Also they claimed that the disproportional electoral system of the preceding period 
had created an unfair mechanism of representation. Next, in the plurality systems, 
they complained, the party winning the plurality might easily follow a dictatorial policy, 
like the one witnessed between 1957 and 1960. Therefore, according to them, what 
was needed was the adoption of a new PR formula which would be suitable for the 
society and which would transmit the popular will fully into the parliament.
Pro-majoritarians, on the other hand, claimed that PR systems would result 
with highly unstable governments. They also defended that the root cause of the 
crises of 1950-60 period was the arbitrary behaviours of political party leaders while 
preparing their party lists. They also claimed that the number of parties becoming 
constant (i.e. a two-party dominance) in the majority formulas was not a significant 
problem due to the fact that all of the parties had more or less similar party programs.
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They also stated that it was impossible for the plurality formulas to result with 
dictatorial governments since the necessary measures had been taken by the 
constitution. Another point they made was that PR would pave way for the 
establishment of small anti-system parties and this would make things worse than 
ever.'*^
Nevertheless, the Constituent Assembly, created in December 1960 by the 
National Unity Committee to prepare a new constitution and a new electoral law, 
abandoned the simple plurality system and adapted the d'Hondt version of 
proportional representation (PR) in the elections for the Grand National Assembly but 
retained the simple plurality system in elections for the Senate of the Republic.'*  ^ '
Under the new electoral laws, the provinces were saved as constituencies for 
both houses. But the total number of seats in the assemblies were fixed at 450 for the 
GNA and 150 for the senate. In fact the original size of the senate was 188. 150 were 
directly elected, 15 are nominated by the President and the remaining 23 were ex­
members of the National Unity Committee.
As happened in the previous system, voters could vote for as many candidates 
as the number of seats of the constituency. For the senate elections, largest provinces 
were divided into smaller electoral districts, having magnitudes of not more than three 
in order to obtain more proportional results. Nevertheless, it could not prevent the 
disproportional results of the 1961 elections.'*  ^ Partly because of this result, in 1964, 
the coalition government under the leadership of RPP changed the electoral law for 
the Senate elections. Correspondingly, for the senate elections, the same PR formula 
used in elections to the GNA has been adopted.“*’ Since then the rules for election to 
the senate have remained largely untouched.
For the elections to the GNA, first of all, the provinces were not divided into 
smaller districts (as happened in the senate elections), and next, as mentioned 
before, PR with d'Hondt formula has been adopted. But, to prevent the increasing 
number of small parties, a quota (barrage) has been adopted. The quota was to be 
calculated for each district as the number of valid votes in that district divided by the
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district magnitude. For example, if the total number of valid votes is 200000 and if 
there are five seats to be filled, the quota is found to be 40000. Parties or independent 
candidates having less than 40000 votes are eliminated. Then, the seats are allocated 
among the parties exceeding the barrage according to the d'Hondt procedure defined 
in the Appendix.
The electoral system for the lower house did not stay unchanged and the law of 
1961 has been amended several times for political interests. Before the elections of 
1965, the electoral formula for both houses was changed again, substituting d'Hondt 
with a Largest Remainder-Hare formula, so called "national remainder" system“**, 
which provided more proportional results.“*5 RPP strategists hoped this new system, 
strongly in favour of minor parties, would prevent the Justice Party (JP) from obtaining 
an absolute majority in the GNA^°. But the calculation proved wrong, since the JP was 
able to win an absolute majority of both the votes and seats in the 1965 elections. 
(See Table 2.3)
Year JP RPP NP NTP TLP NAP TUP RRP Dem.p. NSP
1961 34.8 36.7 14.0 13.7 - - - - - -
(35 .1) (38 .4) (12.0) (14.2)
1965 52.9 28.7 6.3 3.7 3.0 2.2 - - - -
(5 3 .3 ) (29.8) (6.9) (4 .2 ) (3 .3 ) (2 .4 )
1969 46.5 27.4 3.2 2.2 2.7 3.0 2.8 6.6 - -
(56.9) (31 .8) (1.3) (1 .3) (0.4) (0 .2 ) (1.8) (3 .3 )
1973 29.8 33 .3 1.0 - - 3.4 1.1 5.3 11.9 11.8
(3 3 .1 ) (41.1) (-) (0.7) (0 .2 ) (2 .9 ) (10.0) (10.7)
1977 36.9 41.4 - - 0.1 6.4 0.4 1.9 1.9 8.6
(42 .0) (47.3) (3 .6 ) (21— (OJ) A12L·
Source: MiUetvekili Genel ve Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Üotebir Yenileme Sedm i Sonuçlan (The 
Results o f  the National Assembly General Elections and the Elections for Renewal o f  One-Third o f  the 
Senate Membership) (Ankara. T.C.Başbakanhk Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü Yayını, 1977), pp. 2-25.
A/dre: The first fiıgure refers to the percentage o f  votes and the figure in parentheses to the percentage o f  
seats. Totals may not add to 100 because o f  the om ission o f  the independents.
Abbreviations: JP-Justice Party; RPP-Republican People's Party; TLP--Turkish Labor Party; N A P -  
Nationalist Action Party; TUP-Turkish Unity Party; RRP-Republican Reliance Party; D em .P .- 
Democratic Party; NSP-National Salvation Party.
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The JP-dominated parliament changed the electoral law once again in 1968, 
by abolishing the national remainder system and returning to the d'Hondt system with 
the quota^*. Some of the minor parties, however, applied to the Constitutional Court 
for annulment of this law, on the grounds that it conflicted with the democratic 
principles enshrined in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court, in return, found 
some of the provisions of that law-those providing for the electoral barrage (quota)— 
unconstitutional and thus, 1969 elections to the GNA and to the Senate, had to be 
done under the classical d'Hondt formula (i.e. without quotas). Though this alteration 
damaged the balance in favour of the bigger parties, Table 2.3 displays that, in 1969 
elections, JP retained its absolute majority again.
Since 1968, the electoral system (d'Hondt) has been untouched except for the 
concept of preferential voting which has been introduced in 1 9 7 3 . Until that practice, 
voters could not vote for the candidates, but for the party lists. By this arrangement, 
they could cast a preferential vote in favour of one of the candidates in the list 
preferred. There existed two conditions in order to be elected by preferential votes. 
The first condition is to get at least 5000 preferential votes and the second condition is 
to get a definite proportion of the votes cast to his/her party. Because of the 
complexity and hardness of the conditions, few voters made use of it^ '* and therefore, it 
had no significant effects on the 1973 election results.
The "ordinal ballot" application has been abolished in 1979 and from that date 
until the military intervention of 1980 for both assemblies, d'Hondt formula, without a 
quota, has been used.
The overview of the 5 general elections under the constitution of 1961 (1961, 
1965, 1969, 1973, 1977) gives the impression of a proportional but fragmented party 
system.
Table 2.4 shows that, disproportionality index is in parallel with the world-wide 
results. The average ratio of the five elections seem to be very close to the average 
disproportionality index of the d'Hondt-Imperiali c l a s s . T h e  decrease in 
disproportionality rate from 1 90 to 1.02 percent is a consequence of the change of
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the electoral system from d'Hondt (with quota) to "national remainder" (Largest 
remainders-Hare) formula. The sharp increase, in the afterwards, reflects the change 
to d’Hondt (without quota) again. Normally, the rate of disproportionality in 1969 is 
expected to be similar to that of 1961. However both in the 1969 and in the next tvw 
elections, the ratios are unexpectedly high, 8.94, 6.76 and 6.63 percent. According to 
Hale, the explanation lies not in the electoral system, but in the shifts of the overall 
pattern of party politics during this period. Because of the proportional character of the 
system, the number of parties attending to the elections increased continuously, from 
4 in 1961 to 8 in 1969. This multiplication of smaller parties led to more wasted votes, 
and thus a shift away from perfect proportionality.^^
Table 2.4. Indices o f  disproportionality and effective number o f  parties, 1961-1977
Election Year Etisproportionality Effective Num ber o f  Parties
('/· ) N (e) . , . N (p)
1961 1.90 3.40 3 .27
1965 1.02 2.71 2.62
1969 8.94 3.34 2.34
1973 6.76 4.31 3.33
1977 6.63 3.13 2.47
Average 5.05 3 .37 2.80
Note: The methods o f  measuring "disproportionality” (Least Squares method) and "effective number o f  
parties” are taken from Arend Lijphart, Electoral System s and Party Systems: A Study o f  Twenty-Seven 
Democracies. 1945-1990 (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 57-62 and pp. 67-72. 
Abbreviations: N(e)—effective number o f  electoral parties; N(p)--effective number o f  parliamentary 
parties.
Parallel to our analyses in the first chapter, we witness the increase of both 
elective and parliamentary parties between 1960 and 1980, in contrast to the period 
of 1950-60. That is, changes in the election laws gave smaller parties a voice in the 
parliament in which they could never obtain by the simple plurality system. This 
aspect of the PR systems encouraged some politicians to form splinter parties. As 
mentioned above, the number of parties entering the elections increased rapidly. 
However, we should also make the point that the parliamentary parties did not
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increase too much. The reason behind this anomaly, Ozbudun states, was the strong 
two-party tendency of Turkish politics during that era.^^
The reduction of elective parties is a natural consequence of all systems. 
However, the most proportional national remainder system of 1965 seems to cause 
minimum reduction, from 2.71 to 2.62.
On the other hand, of the five elections, only two-1965 and 1 9 6 9 - produced a 
parliamentary majority, former being an earned and the latter a manufactured majority. 
The other three resulted either in long-term coalitions of one of the larger parties with 
the smaller antidemocratic-either Islamic or extreme nationalist-groups, or in 
deadlock situations by failing to give any government, Thus, between 1973 and 
1980, Hale argues that, a high price has been paid for the greater representativeness 
of elections and offers "considering a return to a less proportionally representative 
system"^ ’
However, a contrasting view came from Ozbudun. 'the divisive effects of PR in 
Turkey should not be exaggerated." According to him, the reason of the political crises 
lived in 70s lies in the lack of a "strong commitment to such attitudinal concomitants 
of democracy as avoidance of political violence, respect for the rights of minorities, 
toleration for opposition, and a spirit of compromise and accommodation" in Turkish 
political culture.®® Following that line, it was the inability or unwillingness of the two 
major parties (or the leaders of the parties) to agree on a grand coalition, that gave the 
chance of having important governmental positions to the anti system parties, which 
used this chance in undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Therefore, he explained 
the crisis, "by the attitudes and behaviour of political elites, by elite decisions made at 
critical junctures, and by the patterns of opposition."®*
However, the general tendency among most scholars and intellectuals was to 
put the whole blame onto PR systems without taking political culture into 
consideration. And consequently, the electoral system of post-1980 has been shaped 
in accordance with that tendency of obtaining a less proportional system.
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 ^ However, because o f  three breakdowns o f  democracy, Turkey is not included to comparative electoral 
studies, such as Lypharfs latest study including 27 democracies (cited in the first Chapter).
 ^ Eigun Özbudun, "Turkey," in Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, eds. Myron Weiner and 
Ergun Özbudun (Baltimore: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 329.
 ^Cited in ibid., p. 329.
** Stanford J. Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Centuiy Ottoman Reform 
Movement before 1876,” International Journal o f  Middle East Studies 1, N o.l (Januaiy 1970) : pp. 54-56.
 ^Özbudun, p. 330.
 ^ They have been recombined in 1861 and again divided into two branches, legislative and judicial, in 
1868. See ibid., p. 330.
 ^ In fact, non-Muslim communities were being represented in the central legislative councils since 1856 
(Reform Rescript), but only when matters o f  general concern were debated. By 1867, they held their seats 
in a permanent basis.
 ^Özbudun, p.331.
 ^Those who paid 50 piasters a year in direct taxes.
Cited in Özbudun, p. 331.
The members for the Senate were appointed by the sultan.
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o f  Electoral S3rstem and the Electoral Systems Applied in Turkey 1876-1987) (Ankara, 1989), p. 255.
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to Istanbul. See Özbudun, p. 332.
Aiasli, pp. 255-6.
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Arasli, p. 256.
Ibid., p. 256.
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Özbudun, p. 340.
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Law No: 4918, enacted in June 5, 1946.
3^0z,p. 20.
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advised to the parties, the adoption o f  a Proportional Representation system. But the parties had rejected 
that suggestion claiming that PR can cause unstable governments. See Arasli, p. 258.
William Hale, "The Role o f  Electoral System in Turkish Politics," International Journal o f  Middle East 
Studies 11, No.3 (May 1980) : p. 402.
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In this chapter, first I am going to work on different aspects and implications of the 
electoral law of the National Security Council(NSC)-appointed Consultative Assembly 
(1983), and then deal with the changes-including the reasons and consequences of 
them--made during the Motherland Party governments (1983-1991). Finally, the 
ongoing debates about the probable reform alternatives will be elaborated.
3.1. ELECTORAL LAW of 1983
After the intervention of 12th September 1980, The National Security Council (NSC), 
wished to restructure Turkish democracy so that the crisis of the 1970s could not 
recur and thus, the military's continued involvement in politics would be unnecessary. 
Throughout the three years of military rule, the NSC put the principal blame on the 
economic and political deterioration generally on the political party system. As ErgUder 
and Hofferbert point out that, the immediate culprits in the eyes of the military were on 
the one hand, a set of politicians who had failed to provide leadership, and, on the 
other hand, a set of institutions that seemed to have failed to fulfil their promise. 
Hence, the pluralist aspects of the 1961 Constitution, the parties and the electoral 
system were the "institutional villains.
Accordingly, Ozbudun states, 'the new constitution, the political parties law, 
and the electoral law, prepared by the Council-appointed Consultative Assembly, 
reflect these concerns of the military".  ^ The major instrument of reform, that is, the 
rewriting of electoral and political parties laws, has also been supplemented by tight 
control over participation of the parties, in the first General National Assembly (GNA) 
election under new constitution.^
It can be said that an important reason of the need of a change in these laws 
was the reaction to small parties'-with their small amount of votes and seats-having 
key roles in the making of coalition governments. Although this was a result of the 
irreconciling attitudes of the leaders of the two big parties,'* nevertheless, these minor 
parties felt more confident while bargaining for their own political interests, within the 
coalition governments in which they took part. However, despite this disappointing
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experience, the legislative body was not able to realise the suitable changes which 
could prevent that kind of deficiencies.
The Law on the Election of Deputies has been rewritten to make it more likely 
that instead of the unstable coalition governments (like that of the 1970s), one party 
majority governments will be returned to the GNA.^ Interestingly, instead of obtaining 
a majoritarian formula, the general characteristics of proportional representation was 
preserved as a means of converting votes into seats. However, through some 
modifications on that system, namely putting thresholds and changing district 
magnitudes, the majoritarian aspects of the system weighted more than the 
proportional aspects. In the rest of this section it would be helpful to elaborate those 
modifications.
3.1.i. Thresholds
With the new law two kinds of thresholds were brought into application. According to 
Article 33. the national threshold  has been determined to be %10 of the total valid 
votes both of the national vote in the general elections, and of the sum of the 
constituency votes in the by-elections.
T(n) = %10«
Thus, the political parties with less than the national threshold (%10) were excluded 
from seat allocation under the new law.
The second threshold is the constituency threshold  defined in Article 34 of 
the law. The seats of a district are distributed among parties and the independent 
candidates of the district, depending on whether they had won more than the average 
necessary for seat allocation, i.e. the constituency threshold, or not.
This minimum number of votes below which no candidate shall be allocated a 
seat in the GNA, that is the constituency threshold, is determined by dividing the total 
number of valid votes by the number of deputies to be elected from that district.
T(d) = V /  m
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The names of candidates who obtained more votes than the threshold value 
are written down to comprise a list. The number of votes that each party or 
independent candidate received is first divided by one, then by two, then by three, 
and so on, until the district magnitude is reached (D’Hondt formula). The above- 
calculated shares of votes that each party obtained are ranked from the largest to the 
smallest. The seats are then allocated to the candidates in accordance with the size of 
the above-calculated shares until all seats of the district are distributed.*
If none of the political parties or independent candidates manages to exceed 
the constituency threshold, the same procedure is used with a slight difference such 
that, the number of all of the parties' and independent candidates' votes are divided by 
one, then by two and so on, until the district magnitude is reached. Finally, according 
to the order of shares won, the seats are allocated.^
As stated in the first chapter, the national and constituency thresholds, work for 
the benefit of bigger parties and for the disadvantage of the smaller ones. As it is a 
choice of the legislature'® and as there are different kinds of thresholds in different 
existing electoral systems throughout the world, it \wuld not be fair to criticise the 
makers of the law (when their concerns are taken into consideration). However this 
does not mean that what they had enacted was a good system. The first important 
criticism concerns the level of the national threshold. Indeed, the national threshold is 
very high when compared to other national cut-offs. In Germany, for instance, the 
same threshold is %5 and in Sweden %4.
Actually, the influence of the national threshold on the political system, on the 
representation of the political parties in the assembly, could not be observed in the 
1983 elections, for only three parties were allowed by the National Security Council to 
participate in the elections. As a result, all the three managed to pass that threshold 
value. However, in the 1987 and 1991 elections, it was dramatic to see how many 
votes were not represented in the assembly just because of that national threshold. In 
the 1987 elections, for instance, the votes of the parties other than the three major 
ones and of the independent candidates, that is a total of 4 749 232 votes
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(approximately % 2 0  of the valid votes in the country), could not get the chance of 
being represented in the parliament.“
On the other hand, by means of the practice of the constituency threshold, the 
leading party of the district in question has been given extra advantages 
disproportional with its electoral strength. In Burdur, for instance, while all of the 3 
deputies were won by the Motherland Party with %53 of the votes, the Populist Party 
with %31 of the votes in that district, could not win any seats as it was not able to pass 
the constituency threshold of %33.3. “
Another criticism was directed toward the absence of an option for the 
representation of those minor parties that obtained high numbers of votes in some 
specific districts but could not succeed to pass the national threshold. In many 
countries using PR formulas and national thresholds, in the district level, there exists 
an alternative and independent threshold which gives those small parties the chance 
of winning seats from those districts. “
3.1.ii. Changes in District Magnitudes
In addition to the double-thresholds mentioned above, the same law also reduced the 
district-magnitudes in order to minimise the proportional aspects of the system. 
Previously, as a principle, each province was an electoral district. But in 1983, again 
with the new law (No. 2839), it has been decided that an electoral district could at 
most have a district magnitude of 7. and those provinces that would elect more than 
seven deputies (such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, etc ), should be divided into 
less populous districts (district magnitudes being not more than 7).
The consequence of reducing the district magnitudes was that the 
constituency thresholds of these districts would increase, as the two variables (m, 
T(d)) are inversely related. The probable constituency thresholds, thus, varied 
between %14.3, for a 7-seat district, and %50 for a two-seat district.“  For example, if 
a province had 10  seats, before that re-districting it would have a constituency
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threshold of %1 0, however after that change is enacted, it had one 7 -seat and one 3 - 
seat districts having district-level thresholds of %14.3 and %33.3 respectively.
The division of populous provinces into several less-populous districts also 
had the consequence of increasing the rate of disproportionality which again favours 
the bigger parties. To put it in another way, when the district magnitude decreases, 
the district threshold increases and as a result, it becomes difficult for the smaller 
parties to obtain that amount of votes. This leads to a high disproportionality rate.
By means of re-districting, therefore, the aim of the NSC, that is, preventing 
the representation of minor parties has been realised to a great extent.
Another change introduced by the electoral law of 1983 was that, each 
province, at the beginning, has been allocated a seat irrespective of its population 
and the remaining 333 seats were allocated according to the size of populations of the 
electoral districts. Thus, the rural and less populated districts have been given a 
higher proportion of seats in the Assembly than they had enjoyed in previous 
assemblies. That is, the less populated provinces have been allocated one more seat 
than they could otherwise have obtained if the population size had been taken as the 
sole criterion for the allocation of seats to electoral districts.
This practice, called "malapportionment", though at first sight seems to be 
more proportional as it increases the district magnitudes and thus reduces the 
constituency threshold, in the final analysis, favours the bigger parties, The reason is 
that, in the less-populous provinces, the constituency threshold is high and the 
smaller parties are incapable of passing the two thresholds (national and district- 
level), and therefore, this "one more seat" will be won by the leading party of the 
district. Consequently, this practice, that is, allocating one seat per province 
irrespective of population gives additional advantage to the leading party in that 
district.
This practice also weakens the minor parties in the bigger provinces, because 
the constituency thresholds of the big provinces increase as a result of the decrease 
in their district magnitudes. 20
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To give an example explaining the last two arguments, I assume that a country 
has 30 million voters, 600 seats in its assembly and 100 provinces, and two provinces 
A and B, have populations of 1.5 million and 100 thousands respectively. Without 
allocating each province a seat automatically, the average number of votes per seat 
will be 50 thousands, resulting that province A has a district magnitude of 30, and 
province B of 2. With these magnitudes, the constituency thresholds become %3.3 for 
province A and %50 for province B.
On the other hand, when each province is allocated one seat from the 
beginning, then the resulting 500 seats of the assembly are to be shared among 
provinces according to the populations. In that cáse, the average number of votes per 
seat becomes 60 thousands and the district magnitudes of the two provinces become 
26 and 3 respectively.21 Accordingly, the constituency thresholds were found to be 
%3.8 and %33.3 for the two provinces. It seems that the results are more proportional 
than the previous one and the small parties are more advantageous using that new 
practice. However, this does not hold true, as most of the minor parties could not pass 
the national threshold, in which case, the "one more seats” in each district are won by 
the leading parties. Also, the constituency threshold of province A increased slightly 
which is also a disadvantage for those smaller parties that managed to pass the 
national threshold.
As a result,, the election law of 1983, gave great advantages to the big parties 
and increased the disproportionality rate. The political party that received the plurality 
of votes enjoyed the possibility of getting the majority of seats in the GNA. For 
example, the Motherland Party (MP) got about 45 per cent of the votes in the 1983 
elections and received about 53 percent of the seats in the TGNA.
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3.2. THE MOTHERLAND PARTY PERIOD
Between 1983 and 1987, this electoral law (No: 2839) was changed several times and 
the disproportionate nature of the system increased further.
By the mid-1980s, the Motherland Party began to feel the decline of its popular 
support. The consolidation of increasingly effective political parties, with improved 
linkages to their electoral bases, further undermined the MP's standing.
In response to that decline, MP leaders applied two successful strategies in 
order to change the electoral laws. First, though paradoxically, some new measures 
encouraging the emergence of political parties that could split the votes of the 
opposition parties, were taken. However, it is difficult to measure the effects of this 
strategy, as its influence on voting behaviour can not be calculated independently.
Secondly, majoritarian features-counted above--of the electoral system were 
strengthened at the expense of small parties. The changes taking place were the 
application of district-level candidates, the increase in district-level thresholds and the 
decrease in district-magnitudes.
3.2.i. District-Level (Kontenjan) Candidate
A series of changes introduced by a new law (No; 3270), on the 28th March, 1986 
(just before the 1986 by elections), in the Political Parties Law (Article 38) and in the 
Law on the Election of Deputies (No:2839), made it possible for political parties to 
nominate a district-level candidate in districts, of provinces with 6 or more seats, 
having district magnitudes of 5, 6 , or 7 (Article 10). In these districts where district- 
level candidates are nominated, the party getting the plurality of votes wins that bonus 
seat whether or not it has passed the constituency threshold. It has been found that in 
a probable general election at that time, 34 seats of the assembly were to be elected 
by means of that principle.
A year later—this time, before the general elections-by another law (No:3377), 
Article 38 of the Political Parties Law was changed and the districts that are to have 
district-level candidates were determined again (Article 12). The modification was that
62
the political parties could nominate a district-level candidate in districts, of provinces 
with 6 or more seats, having district magnitudes of 4. 5, or 6 , By means of that 
modification, the number of district-level seats had increased from 34 to 46.
In those districts (having district-level candidates) the distribution of seats 
takes place according to the number that is one less than the district magnitude. 
Hence, by this change, for some districts, electoral law had turned into a mixed one in 
which the district-level candidate is elected by a simple plurality formula, whilst the 
rest of the seats are allocated by a PR (d'Hondt) formula.^^
Although this change did influence only a limited number of districts, it is 
certain that it vwirked for the advantage of the bigger parties and raised the 
disproportionality rate of the elections.
3.2.ii. Increase in constituency thresholds
The law (No. 3270), besides the application of district-level candidate, modified the 
constituency thresholds. That is, in those districts that a district-level candidate is 
nominated by the parties, the threshold value automatically increased as in these 
districts the new rule to calculate it was to divide the number of valid votes into the 
"one less" of the district-magnitude. For instance, in a district having a magnitude of 5, 
and from which a district-level seat is to be elected, district threshold is calculated by 
dividing the number of votes into 4 instead of 5, and is found to be %25 instead of 
%20.23
For the other districts, that is for those districts that do not nominate district- 
level candidates, the previous law (No.2836) was preserved.
However, by means of the (aw (No. 3377) it has been decided that in all of the 
districts the district magnitude would be calculated in one way. Accordingly, the 
constituency thresholds were to be found by dividing the number of valid votes by the 
district magnitude, whether or not the district possessed district-level candidate.
Before the 1987 elections, one more modification has been realised. By two 
laws (No.3403 and 3404) Article 34 of the Law on the Election of Deputies,
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determining the constituency thresholds, has been changed. According to that 
change, the district-level threshold of districts having a magnitude of 6, has been 
calculated by dividing the valid number of votes into 5 instead of 6. As a result, in the 
related districts the threshold becomes %20 instead of %16.6. Needless to say, this, 
once more, works for the disadvantage of the minor parties.^®
The threshold values of the other districts did not change.
3.2.iii. Decrease in district magnitudes
In the original code of the Law on the Election of Deputies (No.2839) district 
magnitude could at most be 7. But with the new law (No;3377), the maximum district 
magnitude was decreased to 6 candidates. Thus, the constituency threshold of 
%14.28 for the districts having 7 seats, increased to %16.66 for those having 6 
deputies. Moreover, it further increased to %20 as a result of the above-mentioned 
change in the constituency threshold of 6-seat districts.
It is certain that, this practice was on the same line with the previous changes, 
that of increasing the disproportionality of the electoral system for the disadvantage of 
the minor parties.
As a result of all these mentioned changes, the system clearly worked against 
the small parties.
Actually, as a consequence of that electoral system, before and after the 
changes introduced by the Motherland Party governments, both in the 1983 and in 
the 1987 elections, only three parties were able to enter the parliament. This result 
can mislead one that, the aim of the military junta of creating a party system with 2 or 
3 parties, was realised. However, this seems to be invalid when the 1991 election 
results are observed. This election, made under nearly the same conditions as the 
1987 election, resulted with the entry of 5 parties to the parliament. This proves that 
the system (whatever the changes are) could not prevent the fragmentation of 
parties. 2«
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3.3. 1991 ELECTIONS
The Motherland Party's voter support first dropped to %36.3 in the 1987 elections and 
to %21 in the 1989 municipal elections. Hence, in the late 1989 and in 1990, the 
opposition parties pressed for an early elections to an early date, claiming that the MP 
government had lost its legitimacy by getting only the one fifth of the total votes in the 
municipal elections. Besides that fact, the change of the president and the leading 
cadre of the party played a role on the government's decision of holding elections a 
year earlier than scheduled.
For the 1991 elections, two important changes need to be elaborated here. 
First, the very-complained high constituency thresholds were reduced to a lower-but 
still very high-level. And next, "preferential voting" has been very influential in those 
elections.
3.3.i. Reduction of Constituency Thresholds
Ironically, with the existing constituency thresholds, it was obvious that the governing 
party, MP, would not be able to pass the thresholds in certain districts. Therefore, 
before the GNA elections of 20 November 1991, by a law (No;3737), the constituency 
thresholds have been slightly reduced. However, these changes were to be valid once 
and only for the 1991 general elections. Accordingly, for the districts with magnitudes 
2 or 3, and for the districts having a magnitude of 4, but one of which being district- 
level candidate, the threshold has been reduced to a level of %25^^ For those 
districts having magnitudes of 5 or 6 , one of which is district-level candidate, the 
threshold has been determined to be %20 .^ ®
Interestingly, those changes did not work for the advantage of the MP. For 
instance, from the 62 districts, having constituency threshold of %25, the party was 
successful in passing the thresholds of only 17.
As mentioned before, by the decrease of the threshold levels, minor parties 
gained strength and the disproportionality decreased to a certain extent.
3.3.H. Vote of Preference
Although the principle of "vote of preference" has been there within the electoral laws 
since 1961, the only elections it had been influential were the 1991 elections.
We have explained in the first chapter that in some electoral systems (PR 
systems with multiple constituencies) the voters are given the right to make changes 
(either limited or completely) on the party lists according to their preferences. In fact, 
the first time when Turkish electorate had influence on the party lists was the 1908 
elections. In that mixed-list system, the voters, while giving their votes to a party, were 
able to change the order of the list.
In the Republican era, with the article 36 of the law (No.4320) enacted in 1942, 
this principle of mixed-list system was legalised. After the enactments in 1946 and 
1950^1, Turkish electorate was able to delete some names from, and instead write 
the new ones to the party-list. This principle, however, had led to the preparation and 
distribution of mixed ballots-arranged in favour of some candidates-to the voters 
before the elections. Some attempts were initiated by the legislature in order to 
prevent such kind of tricks^  ^ and at the end the principle of mixed-lists was 
terminated in 1964.^3
The practice of Vote of preference", on the other hand, was first included in 
the Turkish electoral system in 1961 with the law (no.306). But, both the application 
and the calculation of that principle was so complex '^  ^that it could not have any affect 
on the results.
Nevertheless, when the electoral system has been replaced by the national 
remainder system in 1965, the principal of preferential voting became automatically 
invalid.
In 1973 the practice of vote of preference was brought into use once more^ ®. 
Though this regulation has been in use until 1979, because of similar reasons 
counted above for the preceding practice of the rule (that is, 1961 -65), it did not have 
any significant affect on the election results. When the electoral rules changed-to
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party-list PR-in 1979 ·^ ,^ the practice of vote of preference has been once more 
groundless.
In the post-coup period of 1980s, "vote of preference" principle was once more 
included in the electoral system.^* However, by the provisional 4th article of the 
electoral law, it has been decided not to apply vote of preference in the 1983 
elections. Before the elections in 1987, a new regulation was prepared.^® As the 
conditions of benefiting from the principle of preferential vote were, again, very 
heavy,‘♦0 the regulation could not go further than just being a law.
Finally, the last regulation about the vote of preference took place by the law 
(No.3757) enacted in 25.8.1991, just before the 1991 general elections. By means of 
that new regulation, most of the barriers in front of the efficient use of vote of 
preference were either entirely lifted or softened. For instance, the threshold value for 
a candidate to be elected by votes of preference, that is, the ratio of a candidate's 
preference votes to his party's total valid votes, was reduced from 25% to 15%.
Another important change in the new regulation is that, the number of 
preferences a voter should mark (if he wants to use a vote of preference, of course) is 
determined to be one rather than half of the number of candidates. Ozbudun has a 
very right objection**! that although this second change eased the use of preferential 
vote, on the other hand, it made it difficult for a candidate to gather %15 or more votes 
of preference and thus to be elected by preferential voting.
Another important and challenging change is that the political parties are 
obliged to nominate a number of candidates that is twice the district magnitude. The 
result is that, candidates nominated at the bottom places of their parties' lists, feel 
obliged to try to get the votes of preference of the electorate.
As a result,, after the last regulation, the principle of vote of preference became 
very affective in the last general elections. 61 of the 450 seats in the Assembly were 
filled by votes of preference.·*^ In Eskişehir, for instance, while both of the second and 
the third candidates of the Motherland Party were elected as a result of preferential 
votes, the first candidate could not gain the seat.**  ^ In the third district of Ankara, the
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most extreme case was witnessed: the 10th, i.e, last, candidate of the Motherland 
Party list in that district, Hamdi Eriş, succeeded in gaining an assembly seat by the 
votes of prefernce.'·^
The conclusion that can be drawn from all that story above is that, the usage 
and efficiency of vote of preference is determined by the regulations accepted by the 
legislature.
There is also an interesting debate about the pros and cons of the vote of 
preference. Some people argue that because the voters mainly vote for the political 
parties and their programs, they should automatically approve the order of candidates 
which is decided by these parties. For those, therefore, the preferential voting means 
the weakening of the party discipline. For some others, on the other hand, preferential 
voting gives voters that limited freedom to influence and change the decisions, orders 
of the so-complained party oligarchies. For that state of affairs, Ozbudun offers that 
“we should make a clear choice" as it is impossible to oppose the practice of 
preferential voting while continuously complaining about the power of the party 
oligarchies.‘‘5
Another criticism directed toward the preferential voting is that it makes it 
possible for the ethnic, religious and sectarian groups to be represented to a great 
extent. Here, it seems impossible not to agree with Ozbudun who claims that although 
this is possible in theory, there seems to be no example of that kind of representation 
from the first time the preferential voting has been used in 1961 up until now.'·®
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3.4. CONSEQUENCES of POST-1980 ELECTORAL CHANGES
In the first chapter of that study, we said that the two main consequences of electoral 
systems were their effects on the disproportionality of the electoral outcomes and their 
effects on the party system. W e also stated that these effects are measured by means 
of different indexes. Accordingly, in this chapter, I will calculate these index values, 
that is, the index of disproportionality, the effective number of political parties and, the 
index of fractionalization (fragmentation index).
In Table 3,1 the percentages of votes and seats won by the political parties in 
the parliamentary elections between 1983 and 1991, that is in 1983, 1987 and in 
1991 elections, are given.
Table3.1 Votes and seats won in parliamentao^ elections, 1983-1991 (in percentages).
Year TPP MP SDPP WP DLP SP PP RDP NLP NDP
1983 * 45.1
.( 5 2 .8 )
- - - - 30 .5
(29 .3)
- - 23 .3
(17.8)
1987 19.1
(13.1)
36.3
(64.9).
24.8
(2 2 .0 )
7.2
(-)
8.5
(-)
- - 0.8
(-)
2 .9
(-)
1991 27.0
(39.6)
24.0
J 2 5 ^
20.8 16.9
0 3 -8 )
10.8 0.4
(-)
- -
Source: Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçlan (Özet Tablolar) 20.10,1991 (Results o f  General Election o f  
Representatives (Summary Tables)) (Ankara: T.C, Başbakanlık Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü Yayım, no. 1522, 
1992), pp. xii-xiii.
Note: The first figure refers to the percentage o f  votes and the figure in parentheses to the percentage o f  
seats. Totals may not add to 100 because o f  the omission o f  the independents.
Abbreviations: TPP-True Path Party; M P-M otheriand Party; SDPP--Social Democrat Populist Party; 
WP--Welfare Party; DLP-Dem ocratic Left Party; SP-Socialist Party; PP--Populist Party; RDP-- 
Reformist Democracy Party; NLP-Nationalist Labour Party; NDP-Nationalist Democracy Party.
In Table 3.2, the index of disproportionality for each election since 1980, is
calculated according to Least Squares formula.
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Table 3.2 Indices o f  disproportionality, 1983-1991
Election Year DisproportionaJity
(%)
1983 6.74
1987 23.74
1991 11.34
Average 13.94
Note. The method o f  measuring ’’disproportionality" (Least Squares method) is taken from Arend 
Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study o f  Twenty-Seven Democracies. 1945-1990 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 57-62.
When the table is analysed in detail, it can be easily seen that in the post-1980 
period, all the three elections were disproportional. It is not surprising for us to see that 
the 1983 election was the least disproportional one among the three, as we know that 
only three parties were permitted, by the National Security Council, to participate the 
elections and thus, all three parties were able to pass the national threshold.
Another conclusion derived from the table is that the most disproportional of 
the three is the 1987 elections. This does not seem to be an unexpected outcome for 
us. as we have studied these changes in the electoral system during the period 
between 1983 and 1987.
The reduction in the disproportionality rate in the 1991 elections can be linked 
mainly to two factors. First, as we have seen before, the very high constituency 
thresholds were reduced slightly; and secondly, the unfair nature of the system led the 
minor political parties to merge their forces.
In Table 3.3, the index of fractionalization (based both on parties' vote shares 
and seat shares) and the effective number of parties (again based on vote shares and 
seat shares of the political parties) are calculated respectively.
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Table 3.3 Indices o f  ftactionalization and the effective number o f  parties, 1983-1991.
Election year 
1983 
1987 
1991
Index of fractionalization 
based on votes based on seats 
0.650 0.605
0.760 0.514
0.786 0.720
Effective number of Parties 
based on votes based on seats
2.86 2.53
4.17 2.06
4.67 3.57
Note; The index o f  fiactionalization is introduced in Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences o f  
Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). The formula of· the "effective number o f  
parties" is taken from Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study o f  Twenty-Seven 
Democracies. 1945-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 67-72.
According to the table, the most fragmented election is the 1991 elections 
(both based on votes and on seats) and naturally, the effective number of parties in 
1991 is the largest among the three. The interesting thing about the other data in the 
table is that although the increasing fragmentation, based on votes, is very clear 
between 1983 and 1987, there occurs a decrease in the fragmentation based on 
seats. How can this practice be explained? This can only be explained by the 
Motherland Party's disproportional electoral win in 1987. When they disproportionately 
allocated %64.9 of the seats, naturally the other parties were to be either under or non 
represented which showed them as weak and hence, the system as less fragmented.
When Lijphart’s findings about the effective number of parties in different 
systems are compared'*' ,^ in 1987 with 2.06 effective parliamentary parties, Turkish 
electoral system worked like plurality systems, and in 1991 it seemed to be on the 
side of PR systems, with 3.57 effective parties.
As we observed in the above sections in this chapter, the electoral system 
initiated by the new electoral law of 1983 (No. 2839), in order to obtain single-party 
majoritarian governments and to prevent the fragmentation and instability of the pre- 
1980 period, had given disproportional representation to big parties. Moreover, the
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changes that took place between 1983 and 1991, did not try to correct that 
disproportionality and in contrast, caused that injustice to increase.
When the voting results and the representation ratios in the parliament of the 
political parties are compared, the first important point is over-or-under-or-non- 
representation of some political parties in relation to their votes. The %28.6 over­
representation of MP in the 1987 elections is a perfect example of the support the 
electoral system gives to the leading parties.'*® In the same elections on the other 
hand, whilst the True Path Party (TPP) was % 6  under-represented, the Democratic 
Leftist Party could not even be represented in the Assembly despite its %8.5 of the 
total vote, that is, it has been %8.5 non-represented.‘*®ln the same elections, as seetl 
in Table 3.1, parties that totally obtained %19.38 of the total vote could not be 
represented, i.e. non-represented, in the Assembly.
Realising that, with the electoral law in use, the voter preferences are reflected 
into the parliamentary arithmetic in an unjust and shifted manner, the minor parties 
developed new strategies to guarantee their representation in the assembly. First time 
in the history of Turkish elections, for example, electoral alliances has been built 
among parties in order to pass the national threshold. The Reformist Democracy Party 
and the Nationalist Work Party made an alliance with the Welfare Party, while same 
kind of an alliance was concluded between the People's Labour Party and the Social 
Democratic Populist Party.
Another strategy was the unification of parties so that the voting supports of the 
parties can be gathered in one party. The example of this strategy was the unification 
of the Democratic Center Party with the True Path Party.
The election results of 1991, once more, showed that the system was working 
for the benefit of the leading party. The results were disproportional such that, whilst 
TPP, the leading party, has been %12.6 over-represented, the Democratic Leftist 
Party(DLP) of Ecevit, the smallest party in the new assembly, has been %9.2 under­
represented (see table 31). Put in another way, while MP won one of its seats with 51
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ООО votes, W P with 66 000, SDPP with 57 000 and TPP with 37 000; the DLP had 
won each of its deputies by 375 000 voters.
Another important characteristic of the 1991 elections, though a result of the 
above-mentioned developments, was that, from the 6 of the parties participating in 
the elections, 5 of them had succeeded in gaining deputies, after passing various 
thresholds. Moreover, after the elections, these electoral alliances dissolved, and the 
number of parties in the GNA, and thus the political fragmentation, had increased 
further.
Finally, after the elections it has been found out that no single party was able 
to rule. Hence, 11 years after the intervention—or 8 years after the enactment of the 
new electoral law-Turkey was once more being governed by a coalition government.^! 
To put in another way, the 1991 elections made it clear that the aim of the National 
Security Council (in establishing a new law), that is "a parliamentary system with big 
but limited number of political parties and with single-party governments," could not 
be reached in the long term.
3.5. ELECTORAL REFORM OPTIONS
When all the electoral systems which have been experienced in Turkey are studied, it 
has been observed that while the simple plurality system of 1950s had caused unjust 
and disproportionate electoral results, the PR system (with D'Hondt formulas) had an 
important role on the instability of the political regime and prevented the efficient 
working of both the government and the parliament.
The system practised after 1980, thus, aimed to prevent unstable 
governments, by means of maintaining governments based on the majority of a 
single party. However as studied above, after a while, it has been understood that this 
aim could not be reached and, despite the practice of thresholds (both national and 
district-level), and the practice of district-level candidates (elected by simple plurality), 
after the 1991 elections, a coalition government started to rule the country.
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But, the fact that the electoral system did not create a single-party government 
in 1991, does not necessarily mean that it can not. With that system, it is possible 
that a party can win all of the seats in a district, having a magnitude of 6 for instance, 
in the case that it obtains one more votes than the district-level threshold of %2 0 , 
while the other parties can not pass that threshold. And if this kind of a distribution of 
votes recurs uniformly in all districts, a party having slightly more than % 2 0  of the 
votes can easily obtain the majority of the parliament. The Motherland Party’s electoral 
victory of 1987, for instance, is a good example to show that these kind of scenarios 
do not just prove theoretical.
As Ozbudun notices 2^ 3 party's obtaining more than %50 of the seats with 
%20 voter support can not be accepted either in a PR or in a simple plurality system.
The increasing political fragmentation and the rather disproportional results of 
elections (see Table 3.3) are (or should be) major concerns for the politicians, 
journalists and scholars while debating the need and options of reform.
Consequently, especially after the last municipal elections-!.e. after the 
unexpected victory of the religious-based Welfare Party (RP) and the failure of the 
centre parties-the need of a reform in the electoral system had come into the agenda 
of the media and the parliament.
Of course, it is not easy to agree with those who think that the alteration of the 
electoral laws will solve the country's problems overnight. However, it seems probable 
that before the next parliamentary elections, to be held in 1996^^, Turkish parliament 
will change the existing electoral system. Possible modifications are suggested by the 
intellectuals, mainly by political scientists and journalists. Thus, the remainder of this 
chapter will discuss those possible changes.
In Turkey there does not exist a consensus on the nature of the electoral 
system, among the main actors: political parties. While some believe that the country 
needs an electoral system which will bring governability, stability and order, some 
others insist on the importance of full proportionality of an electoral system. On the 
basis of these arguments, there lies the dichotomy of proportional representation vs.
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plurality and majority systems, a fundamental division within the classification of 
electoral systems.
Nevertheless, if we summarise, the increasing fragmentation of the party 
system and the tendency of the electoral system to give very disproportional results 
have turned the electoral system into a gamble. In this respect, I agree with Özbudun 
that, the only escape from that electoral system crises, at least in the short run, is 
either to increase the proportionality of the system by bringing some proportional 
measures; or to develop a new system in which fragmented parties would feel the 
necessity of making alliances with each other in order to be represented.^'* Therefore, 
the alternatives are not unlimited.
3.5.I. Majoritarian Alternatives
Among the three majoritarian formulas introduced in the first chapter, the first one, 
that is. simple plurality system is not taken into consideration as a possible alternative, 
by any of the political scientists or journalists or politicians, as far as my studies are 
concerned. But the other two formulas double-ballot and a different type of alternative 
voting, majoritarian compromise, is being discussed, mostly among the scholars and 
journalists.
3.5.i.a. Double-ballot
The majoritarian formulas require an absolute majority--!.e. more than half of 
the valid votes~for election. As the maintenance of an absolute majority without any 
arrangement happens rarely, one way to fulfil this requirement is to conduct a run-off 
second ballot
The most important consequence of that system is that, it encourages 
alliances between the ideologically similar parties. Although the second ballot can 
have more than two candidates, the usual second-ballot pattern in France is a race 
between the two strongest candidates, as the weaker ones are either legally out (those
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failing to win %12.5 of the vote in the first ballot), or may themselves withdraw (those 
above %12.5 but with little chance of winning) in favour of their allied parties. 55
Ozbudun points out that this formula does not impose a two-party system, but 
encourages the formation of two blocks, namely the moderate (centre) right and 
moderate left. He has also listed the advantages of the system as follows^ .^
a. If the parties that made alliances in the second ballot, win the elections, it 
will be easier for them to form a stable government;
b. as the political competition is between the two blocs, it includes some main 
characteristics of a two-party system. For instance the change of governments take 
place in harmony, which leads to the accountability of the ruling parties against the 
voters,
c. the anti-system parties are either under-represented or non-represented as 
they can not find support in the second ballot.
The deficiencies of reforming the electoral system in that direction, according 
to Kalaycioğlu** and Türk”  are as follows;
a. As mostly, the %50 majority could not be obtained in the first ballot, for 
many districts the second ballot would be inevitable. And the costs of the elections 
would be doubled both for the candidates and for the country because of the need of 
another campaign for the second ballot. The very high costs of the campaigns will 
raise the density of patronage relations between the candidates, political parties and 
different interest groups.
b. Türk stresses the fact that in all single-district formulas, party discipline is 
loosened as the personality, identity of the candidate, such as ethnic, religious, 
sectarian background, becomes important. According to Turk, the consequence of 
that development would be the existence of a shifting or unreliable majority 
government in the parliament. Hale is in the same line with Türk, in the sense that, 
single-member districts have certain disadvantages It would help to strengthen the 
power of tribal leaders and landowners as the constituency borders will be narrowed. 
Thus the elections would be localised, for the small parties could win only in areas
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where they could obtain local support.*® And accordingly, regional and sectarian 
politics will be more important than party politics;
c. As a result of the patron-client relations, the deputies elected can not be 
highly qualified;
d. Especially in Turkey, it may be difficult to divide the country into single­
member districts before each election, as there is a very fast growing migration from 
rural places to big cities. In addition to its practical difficulty, such re-districting can 
cause gerrymandering if the borders of each district are to be drawn in an abnormal 
way, that is according to the short-term political interests.
e. Türk points out another iniportant fact that the second ballot has moral 
deficiencies such that in the period of withdrawal of minor parties in favour of the 
others, that is, during the creation of alliances, there can be a great deal of bargaining. 
As he states, even in France, this kind of developments were taking place.
f  In this system, a single-party government is not guaranteed and it is very 
probable that a coalition of the allies will form the government. Accordingly, the minor 
parties can have an important say in the government, resembling the ''painful" 
coalitions of the 1970s.
g. Finally, the disproportionate results are inevitable.
h. Kalaycioglu, also indicates that, whom the voter is selecting becomes 
impossible to understand as he/she votes for one party at the first ballot but for an 
alliance of parties at the second. In my opinion there is nothing strange in that 
characteristic of the double-ballot system, and what is more, by providing this principle 
the system prevents the absence of minor parties, as it lets the voters behave 
candidate-based (voting for a smaller party for instance) in the first ballot and also 
party-based in the second ballot. *-
Against some of these claims, Ozbudun argues that, it is difficult to prove that 
the identity (ethnicity, religion, sects, region) is predominant only in single-member 
district simple plurality or double ballot systems as in the current system the
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examples of that behaviour also exists. Secondly, except limited regions, according to 
Ôzbudun claims that, the patron-client relations had lost their influence in Turkey.
Next, contrary to the belief that the quality of the deputies will decrease, he 
stresses another important point that many qualified people-hesitating to enter 
politics just because of the party hierarchy and the delegates system-can be more 
tempted to compete in the elections and thus a new and a modern reorganisation can 
take place within the parties. Ozbudun also proposes another alternative way of 
getting the qualified people into the parliament: the election of a number of deputies 
nominated on the national lists.
For Ozbudun, there is nothing bad with some loosening of party discipline as 
a result of single-members districts as the most complained aspect of the political 
party system in Turkey has been the power of the party oligarchies. Additionally, this 
system in both ballots (but especially in the first one) gives the voters, the right to 
make personal preferences,®^
Also as against the disproportionality claims, Ozbudun argues that, the double 
ballot system takes not only the first but also the second preferences of the voters into 
consideration. Following this way of reasoning, the 1993 French elections can be 
reviewed in another way such that, the Centre Right Alliance had not won the %85 of 
seats just by %40 of the votes but by over then %50 of the sum of first and second 
preferences of the voters.
3.5.i.b. Majoritarian Compromise
The second majoritarian model suggested for the Turkish elections is the 
majoritarian compromise system developed by Murat Sertel and Ersin Kalaycioğlu 
from Boğaziçi University.®^
According to the inventors, the system can be used in both single-member 
and multi-member constituencies. Like the alternative voting and STV, in that system, 
the electorate may use his/her vote by putting the parties into the order of preference. 
If a party wins the majority of the first preferences, the candidate of that party wins the
election in that constituency. Otherwise, the second preferences of the voters are 
considered by simply transferring them to the parties' total votes in the first count. If 
one of the parties obtains the majority, then its candidate is elected. If not, the same 
procedure is repeated by adding the third, fourth, etc. preference-votes for parties to 
their total number of votes in the previous counts.®^
In the multi-member districts, a seat could be won by filling the quota , which is 
defined as:
n / ( k +  1 )
where n is total votes, and k is the district magnitude (number of seats to be filled in 
the district). The formula then works as if it was a single member district
Like the double-ballot system and transferable voting systems (alternative vote 
and STV), the main premises of that system are first, the consideration of preferences 
of voters in the electoral process and next, the ability of not electing a party/candidate 
that is not supported by the majority of the electorate.
For Kalaycioglu and Sertel the only difference between the transferable voting 
systems and majoritarian compromise is that the latter finds the winner at most by the 
third preferences, while the former must check all of the preferences,®* which is a time 
consuming process. It might be true that the majoritarian compromise can elect in 
two or three steps but it has a slight effect on the consequences, and for the highly 
computerised systems of near future, the difference between the two systems can only 
be measured in terms of seconds, or at worst in terms of minutes.
What I found to be a fundamental difference between the two groups is their 
evaluation of the "first preference." More clearly, the transferable voting systems give 
more emphasis to the first preferences and that is the reason they eliminate the 
weakest party, that is the one having the least support of the majority according to first 
preferences.®®
Majoritarian compromise, on the other hand, considers all of the preferences 
(first, second, third, etc.) to be of equal value. That is why it does not eliminate that
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weakest candidate, thinking that he/she can be the winner-can obtain the majority 
support—by the second, third, or next preferences '^ ®
Even though it seems hard to favour a specific system, according to my 
opinion the first preference should be more precious than the others. And for the 
possibility that the voters can, by the second or third preferences, compromise on the 
weakest candidate, my comment would be: If they were to compromise on him/her 
they should not let him/her to be the weakest candidate.
In their system proposal, Sertel and KalaycioQlu criticise the double-ballot 
system heavily. There are many sides in double-ballot system that are often criticised 
(as we counted above), however, their critique is somehow different:
KalaycioQlu and Sertel claim that, in double-ballot systems a strong party can 
consciously be divided into two parts before the first ballot, thus preventing the others' 
entry to the second ballot, and at the end can win the seat.· !^
Although this is a theoretically possible case, it seems nearly impossible to 
practice it in a real election: First of all, it is not possible to estimate the results of the 
first ballot earlier (in order to decide on the shares of the smaller parties that are to be 
created before the first ballot)· -^ Nevertheless, if we assume that the results are 
estimated as follows: Party A will get 42%; Party B, 20%; Party C, 20%; and Party D, 
18% of the total vote in the first ballot. According to KalaycioQlu and Sertel's 
proposition, before the first ballot Party A should divide itself into exactly equal 
parties with vote shares 21%, so that the other parties will be eliminated in the first 
round. But how can the leaders of Party A be sure that the voters will cast their votes 
according to that strategy?"^  ^ And also how can they be sure that the rival parties will 
just watch these developments without building alliances among themselves? 
Therefore, practically Kalaycioglu and Sertel's assumption can not be realised. 
However, despite all these impossibilities, if Party A in our example case, manages to 
be divided into two and wins the election, the reason behind that result will not be the 
electoral system, but the behaviour of both the voters and the other parties.
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Nevertheless, a common point of the majoritarian reform suggestions in Turkey 
nowadays is that, both of them (double-ballot and majoritarian compromise) stresses 
the importance of the next preferences of the voters. In other words, they try to 
maintain the election of a candidate/party with the majority support of the voters.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to discuss the likely effects of either of these 
systems, since there does not exist any scientific researches about how the Turkish 
voters' second preferences would be distributed.' '^·
3.5.ii. PR Alternatives
Another solution proposed was to increase the proportionality of the system in use.
To begin with, nobody wants the existing system, d'Hondt with thresholds. The 
problem with the electoral system in Turkey is that although the formula used is a PR 
formula, it operates like a majoritarian formula. (See Table 3.2) The reason behind that 
anomaly is the exceedingly high thresholds and many electoral-engineering 
manipulations that are realised by the Motherland Party(MP) governments.
Therefore, the first reform movement in order to escape the electoral crisis of 
Turkey might be to get rid of or soften all these additional changes (for example the 
constituency thresholds) that MP governments brought. The national threshold of 10% 
should be lowered to 4 or 5% so that both the proportionality rate can increase and at 
the same time, anti-system parties can be prevented from representation.
3.5.ii.a. Highest Averages Formulas with Lower Thresholds
After lifting the threshold, one of the Highest Average Formulas (Sainte-Lague or 
D'hondt) explained in the first chapter can be used for the distribution of seats to 
parties. D'Hondt formula, for instance, is the one legally in use. (See Appendix for the 
operation of d'Hondt formula)
Hikmet Sami Turk's proposal, for instance, uses that method·^  ^ with divisors 
{1.5, 2.0, 2.5,..} instead of {1, 2, 3} so as to favour the bigger parties to a greater 
extent. Turk's calculations suggest that, under that formula, RPP could obtain the
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majority of the National Assembly seats in 1977 (for the sake of less proportional 
representation of the two minor parties NAP and NSP) and thus could govern the 
country without needing the transfer of deputies from other parties.
This might be true for the 1977 elections, however, the socio-political 
conditions of Turkey and the voter alignments changed remarkably and the 
fragmentation among the political parties has increased. New social movements, and 
consequently some new cleavages have begun to emerge. Therefore, I have serious 
doubts that an electoral formula which could maintain a majority government in the 
past, can show the same performance under these conditions. What is more, that 
formula, like those of the Motherland Party, under the current conditions, can cause 
further disproportionality in favour of the leading party·^ ® even if it leads with a very 
slight margin.
Modified Sainte-Lague formula also uses the same system, that is Highest 
Averages formula, but yields slightly more proportional results. (See Appendix)
If one of these formulas are to be taken, the district magnitudes should also be 
enlarged in order to decrease the influence of the constituency threshold.
S.S.ii.b. Largest remainders formulas and STV
All of the largest remainders formulas such as Hare, Droop or Impérial! are not so 
much admired as they return nearly full proportional results. There is that fear that, an 
excessive degree of proportionality would help to the emergence and strengthening of 
anti system parties, as happened in 1970s. Another reason linked to the 
proportionality is that, the larger parties would not accept such a system working for 
their disadvantage.
The problem with list-PR (either Highest averages or largest remainders type) 
is that the voters generally vote for the party lists and thus do not have a mutual 
relationship with the candidates. This leads both to a very hierarchical party structure 
and to a kind of patron-client relationship, as the candidates are only responsible to 
the party elites who have nominated them. This problem is solved in the Single
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transferable Vote (STY), practised in Ireland and Malta. STV is admired by the 
students of electoral systems, because it both permits voting for individual candidates 
and yields proportional results at the same time. However, there are not many 
advocates of STV in Turkey. The only one, Kalaycioglu has shifted to the side of the
majoritarian compromise, a system having similarities with STV.
c. German Additional Member System (AMS)
In the first chapter, following Lijphart, we introduced German system as a two-tier 
districted system in which 'the advantage of reasonably close voter-representative 
contact offered by the districts" was combined with 'the advantage of greater 
proportionality and minority representation offered by larger districts." Indeed, 50% of 
the seats are allocated in the single-member districts, while the other 50% are 
allocated proportionately in the higher-tier according to the most proportional largest- 
remainders Hare formula. Though it might seem like a mixed system of PR and 
Plurality, when the consequences are concerned, it acts like a PR system. And that is 
why. it is being studied here, that is within PR alternatives.
A number of countries, between the years 1993 and 1994, moved from the 
extremes of proportional and majoritarian systems towards the German system.
Interestingly, this system has not yet been discussed in Turkey. In the first instance, 
it resembles the Senate experience of 1961-1977, in fact, in that era, both of the 
houses used the same form ula-PR- except for the 1961 election. Therefore, the 
system seems attractive to me in the sense that, it combines the accountability 
principle of plurality rule, maintained by the close relationship of voters and 
representatives, with a very low rate of disproportionality.
However, it is not certain whether the AMS will cure the ills of the political 
systems of those countries and thus, it might be very risky for Turkey to adopt such a 
system during such a critical period. There would be lots of administrative problems as 
well, as the constituency boundaries would need to be redrawn for each tier, if the 
system is established.
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Of course, it is evident that whatever the formula is, all PR systems will lead to 
coalition governments as-under the above-described conditions of the Turkish 
politics-it seems impossible for any party to obtain the majority of the seats in the 
parliament with a PR formula. It is certain that, we had "bad" coalition experiences in 
the past. But as Ozbudun states, it was the inability or unwillingness of the two major 
parties to agree on a grand coalition at that time, which caused the "painful" coalitions 
with anti-system parties and thus undermined the legitimacy of the regime.
Therefore, if the politicians have taken the necessary lessons from those 
unpleasant experiences, future coalition periods can produce better results. However, 
in the final analysis, it is a matter of political culture, that is, in most of the western 
democracies having similar PR formulas, these shortcomings do not exist. And, 
unfortunately, the political culture of a society changes slower than one expects.
 ^ Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. HofFerbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change 
in Voting Patterns" in State, Democracy and the Militaiy: Turkey in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and 
Ahmet Evin (Berlin; Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 82-3.
“ Quoted from Ergun Ozbudun, "Turkey" in Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, eds. 
Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun (Baltimore: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 357.
 ^ According to the provisional 4th article o f  the Political Parties Law, the National Security Council was 
given the right to veto the founding members o f  the newly established political parties. As a result o f  this 
provisional article, three new parties-True Path Party (TPP), Grand Turkey Party and Social Democratic 
Party (SDP)-were left out o f  the elections with the claim that they were the successors to former biggest 
parties, that is to JP and RPP. Moreover, another article-the provisional 2nd article-of the Electoral Law 
required parties to have established their organisations in at least half o f  the provinces to qualify for 
electoral competition. Therefore, only three parties were able to qualify the conditions to compete in the 
1983 general elections, the Motherland Party (MP), Populist Party(PP) and Nationalist Democracy Party 
(NDP).
Süle}anan Demirel o f  Justice Party and Bülent Ecevit o f  Republican People’s Party.
 ^ Law No; 2 8 3 9 ,10th June, 1983.
 ^T(n) = National threshold
 ^T(d) = District level threshold, V = Number o f  valid votes, m = District magnitude.
 ^Example: The number o f valid votes in a district is 100.000 while the district magnitude is 5.
Thus the district-level threshold T( d) becomes 100 000 / 5 = 20 000.
If the votes obtained by the parties are as follows:
Party A: 35 000; Party B: 27 000; Party C. 20 000; Party D; 18 000; then the procedure is as follows:
Party' В
27 0 0 0 / 1 = 27 000 
27 0 0 0 /2  = 13 500
Party^  C
20 000 /  1 =  20 000
Party^  DParty A
35 000 / 1 = 35 000 
35 0 0 0 /2  = 17 500 
35 0 0 0 /3 =  11 666
At the end the seats are allocated in the following order: 1-Party A; 2-Party B; 3-Party' C; 4-Party A; 5- 
Party В
 ^Article 33 o f  the Law on the Election o f  Deputies (No. 2839).
The 1983 Constitution, like the previous one, did not impose an electoral law and it left the right to 
choose the system to the legislative. Oya Arash, Seçim Sistemi Kavramı ve Türkiye’de Uygulanan Seçim
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Sistemleri 1876-1987 (The Concept o f  Electoral System and the Electoral Systems Applied in Turkey 
1876-1987) (Ankara, 1989), p. 280.
 ^  ^ The parties that could not be represented and their votes are as follows;
Welfare Party : 1.717.425 Reformist Democracy Party . 196.272.
Democratic Left Party : 2.044.576 Nationalist Labour Party : 701.538
Independents : 89.421
Source: Results o f  General Election o f  Representatives (Summary Tables) 20.10.1991, State Institute o f  
Statistics, Prime Ministi^^ Republic o f  Turkey, (Ankara; DIE Enstitüsü Matbaasi, 1992), p. xii.
12 Ibid., p. 24.
1^  In Sweden, for instance, if  a party wins at least %12 o f  the votes in a district, but can not pass the 
national threshold o f  %4, it is allowed to allocate the seats it won in the district level. Arash, p. 279. 
Accordingly, the district-level thresholds o f  various district magnitudes are as follows;
T(2) = %50; T(3) = %33,3; T(4) = %25; T(5) = %20; T(6) = %16.6; T(7) = %14.3.
1^  In the first chapter, it was mentioned that there is a strong and direct relationship between the district 
magnitude and the proportionality index.
1^  Ergun Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye" (Electoral Systems and Turkey) (1995) unpublished 
article, pp. 14-15.
1*^  Ibid., See also Ersin Kalaycioğlu, "The Turkish Political System in Transition: Multi-Party Politics in the 
1980s," Current Turkish Thought 56 (Fall 1985) ; pp. 16-8.
As far as my studies are concerned, the only scholar mentioning that deficiency o f  the system seems to 
be Özbudun. However, he skips the proportional "image" o f  that practice, that is the reduction o f  district- 
level thresholds as a result o f  the increase o f  one seat in the district magnitudes. For his elaboration o f  
that change, see Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye," p. 15.
İn 1991 elections, for instance, while 28 969 voters elected one member o f  parliament in Hakkari, on the 
other hand, in Istanbul (in the second district) 106 611 voters elected one member. See Ibid., p. 15.
2^  This decrease in district magnitudes o f  big cities is a result o f  giving one more seat to smaUer cities.
21 For city A  1 500 00 / 60 000 = 25. For City B; 100 000 / 60 000 = 1.6 rounded as 2. As one seats were 
allocated earlier for both o f  the cities, the resulting magnitudes become (25 + 1) and (2 + 1), that is 26 and 
3.
22 An act passed in July 1986, for example, relaxed the rules o f  admission o f  political parties to national 
elections, as well as their access to the use o f  public radio and TV.
2^  Özbudun, p. 16; Arasli, pp. 283-4; See ako Hikmet Sami Türk "Türkiye İçin Nasıl Bir Seçim Sistemi?" 
(What Kind o f  an Electoral S}^stem for Turkey), in Türkiye İçin Nasıl Bir Seçim Sistemi? Sistem Önerileli 
Seçim Uygulamalan (What Kind o f  an Electoral System for Turkey? System Proposals, Electoral 
Applications) (my translation), eds. H.S.Türk and Erol Tuncer (Ankara: TESAV, 1995), pp. 39-40.
2^  ^ For example, in a district having 100 000 voters and 6 seats, with the d'Hondt formula and without the 
practice o f  district-level candidate, the district-level threshold should be 100 000 / 6 =  16 666 or 16 percent. 
However, in this procedure, first the district-level candidate is subtracted fi-om the district magnitude (6 - 1 
= 5) and then the new threshold is calculated; 100 000 / 5 = 20 000, that is 20 percent 
25 To formulate them. T(6) = 100 / (6 - 1) = %20; T(5) = 100 / (5 - 1) = %25 and T(4) = 100 / (4 - 1) = 
%33.3.
2^  Özbudun, p. 17.
2^T(5) = %20; T(4) = %25; T(3) = %33.3; T(2) = %50.
2^  Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye," pp. 17-8.
2^  The previous thresholds were 50, 33.3 and 33.3 percent respectively.
The previous thresholds were 25 and 20 percent respectively.
.Article 24 o f  the law (no. 4918) in 1946 and Article 89 o f  the law (no.5545) in 1950.
■^2 In 1954, article 91 o f  the law (no.6428) provided that a mixed-listing can be only accepted (counted) if  
the voter makes the list with his own handwriting. Another law, in 1957, banned the distribution o f  pre­
organised ballots to the electorate.
Article 1 o f  the law (no.447 ).
First, according to the 25th and 26th articles, the voter, i f  he is going to use a vote o f  preference within 
a party list, should put exactly half o f  the names in the list into order o f  preference. Otherwise, that is, 
w^hen he puts less or more number o f  signs than the h a lf , tfiat ballot were to be count as an ordinary 
(liaving no preference) ballot. NexT the 33rd article o f  the law arranged the selection o f  the MPs fi*om the 
parties’ candidates in such a manner that the order o f  the party list was more influential than the vote o f  
preferences.
According to that new' system {13.2.1965; Law' No;533) the seats that the parties has won, W'ere 
allocated according to the order o f  the party lists.
^^  26.6.1973, Law No. 1783.
"^ 17.5.1979, Law No.2234.
^^1983, Law No.2838.
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28.3.1986, Law No.3270.
According to that system, the parties could nominate just as the same number o f  candidates as the 
district magnitude. And those voters \^'ishing to use vote o f  preference, were to prefer exactly half o f  the 
number o f  candidates iby putting an "x" near the names o f  the preferred candidates) o f  the party they vote 
for. In addition to this, in order to be elected by the votes o f preference, total valid votes o f  preference 
won by a candidate should be more than or equal to one fourth ( 25% ; o f  the total valid votes won by the 
party.
Ergun Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri. Bazı Doğrular ve Yanlışlar," Bülten 10 (December 1991): p. 18. 
However, following Özbudun’s objection, if  the number o f  preferences were not reduced to one, that is 
i f  it stayed as half the number o f  candidates o f  a party in a districtias in the 1987 elections), with that new  
threshold o f  % 15, the number o f  seats won by preferential vote would certainly be more than 61.
^^3 Result o f  General Election o f  Representatives, 20.10.1991 (Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası: Ankara, 
1992), p.202.
^  Ibid., p.52.
Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri; Bazı Doğrular ve Yanlışlar", pp. 17-8.
Ibıd.,p.l8.
For the simple-plurality systems the effective number o f  parties has been found to be 2.1 and for PR 
systems it has been found to be 3.8. See Arend Lijphart, Democracies (New Haven and London: Yale 
LIniversity Press, 1984), pp. 120-3.
As seen from Table 3.1, in the 1987 elections, whilst MP had won %36.3 o f  the total votes, in the 
parliament however, it gained %64.9 o f  the seats.
49 'ppp obtained 59 seats, that is %13.1 o f  the parliament, with its %19.1 voting support. DLP, on the 
other hand, could not manage to pass the national tiireshold value o f  %10. See Table 3.1.
3^Murat Erdoğan, "Türkiye'de Seçim Sisteminde Baraj Uygulaması ve Bu Çerçevede 21 Ekim 1991 Genel 
Seçimleri" (The Practice o f  Thresholds in Electoral System in Turkey and the 21st October 1991 General 
Elections in that Context) (my translation) Bülten 12 (October 1992): pp. 29-36.
The ruling government since 1991 is a coalition o f  two parties, namely the True Path Party and the 
Social Democratic Populist Party.
Ergun Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye," p. 21.
33 If the election takes place in 1996, it will be the first, in the Turkish electoral history, that is being held 
after a 5 years' period. However, nowadays (June 1995) there are some 'rumours’ that the elections can be 
taken to an earlier date this year.
3^  Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye," p. 21.
33 Lijphart, Democracies, pp. 151-2.
3^  Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye", pp. 22-25; Ergun Özbudun, "Mevcut Seçim Kanunu 
Türkiye'ye Kumar Oynaüyor", M illiyet 2 Febmary 1995, p. 16.
3^  ^ In the Fifth Republic for instance, the reason behind the acceptance o f  that system was to limit the 
Communists’ power in the parliament. See Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye", pp. 22-3.
3^  Ersin Kalaycioğlu, "İki Turlu Sistem Çok Sakmcah", M illivet 13 July 1995, p. 16.
з  ^ Cited in "Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Seçim Sistemleri," (Electoral Systems in the World and in Turkey)
(my translation) Bilgi 8, December 1994, p. 37.
William Hale, "Role o f  the Electoral System in Turkish Politics," International Journal o f  Middle East 
Studies ll ,N o .3 (M a y  1980) : p. 415.
For that disproportionality argument, Türk gives an example from the 1993 French elections: In those 
elections, whilst the Central Right .Alliance had won %40 of the votes in the first ballot after the run-off 
they had obtained % 85 o f  the seats in the parliament. Türk states that in that case the party in question 
had been %45 over-represented. Cited in Bügi, p. 38.
David Goldey and Philip Williams, "France," in Democracy and Elections, eds. V.Bogdanor and 
D.Butler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 62-83.
3^ Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye", p. 24.
^  Ibid., pp. 24-5.
3^ Ersin Kalaycioğlu and Murat Sertel, Türkiye İçin Yeni Bir Seçim Yöntemi Tasanmma Doğru (Toward a 
New Electoral System Design for Turkey) (Istanbul: TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s 
Association), 1995).
Let the following table be the preferences o f  a single-member constituency with 100 voters and five
18 ballots 19 ballots 20 ballots 21 ballots 22 ballots
A B C D E
E A B C D
B C A B C
D D D A A
C _____ E_____________, E _ j _____________ _ B
8ü
The first count shows that none o f  the parties obtains the majority o f  the votes Tthat is 51). Then the 
second preferences in each ballot is added to the parties first count;
A ’s total votes become 18 (first preference; + 19 ( second preferences) = 37
B's
C's
D's
E‘s
19 (
20 ( 
21 ( 
22 (
) + 2 0 f  
) + 21 ( 
) + 22( 
)+ 18(
) = 3 9  
) =41  
) = 43  
) = 4 0
As a result none o f  them gains the majority and therefore, the third preferences are considered. After the 
third preferences are transferred to the parties the total votes o f  the parties become.
A  = 37-^ 20 = 57; B = 39 + 18 + 21 =  7^ ; C = 41-i- ¡9 -h 22 = S2; D = 43 + 0 = JS; E = 40-h 0 = M  
As three o f  the parties obtained more than 50% o f the votes, the one having the most number o f  votes, 
that is C with 82 votes, is elected. Source: Ibid., p. 241.
In fact the formula works in the same way as explained in 68th footnote. The major difference being the 
quota. While in single-member district s the quota is 50%, for multi-member districts this quota decreases.
Kalaycioglu and SerteL pp. 221-3.
In a way, we may accept the double ballot formula as a transferable vote as som e parties are eliminated 
on the fiirst round and voters ,themselves, transfer their votes to a second party in the second ballot.
Kalaycioglu and Sertel, pp. 1 7 3 -n 7 .
Ibid., 126-128.
I would like to remind the reader that almost every' public survey made before the March 1994 
municipality elections proved to be wrong.
In a different place o f  their study they also accept that "division and union o f  parties is practically not 
easy and riskless.” See Kalaycioğlu and Sertel.
One such research, in which I took place, was taking place under the auspices o f  Dr.Gençkaya o f  
Bilkent University, at the time o f  that study. Some surveys, prepared for the newspapers, have been 
published, but their accuracy is ambiguous.
Hikmet Sami Türk, "Türk Seçim Hukukunun Bazı Somnlan" (Some Problems o f  Turkish Electoral 
Law), paper delivered in ”Kanun-i Esasinin 100. Yılı Sempozyumu" 9-11 April 1976.
Türk’s proposal also gives greater premium to major parties, while preventing the full proportional 
representation o f  minor parties.
Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey,” pp. 356-7.
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4.1 THEORY
The universal essence of democracy is its being representative. That is, elected 
officials make decisions on behalf of the people. An electoral system, thus, is a 
fundamental element of representative democracy, as it performs the election of these 
representatives.
Borrowing Lijphart's categorisation of democracies as majoritarian and 
consensus models, the plurality and majority formulas with single-member districts 
are a perfect reflection of majoritarian philosophy: the candidate supported by the 
largest number (either plurality or more than 50%) of voters wins, and all other voters 
remain non-represented. Moreover, the party gaining a nation-wide majority or plurality 
of votes will tend to be over-represented in terms of parliamentary seats, in contrast, 
the basic aim of proportional representation (PR), the system needed for the 
consensus model of democracy, is to represent both majorities and minorities and, 
instead of overrepresenting any parties, to translate votes into seats proportionally. '■
Majoritarian formulas are either grouped according to their quotas, that is 
whether they provide a representative is to be elected by majority support or not; or 
according to the condition whether they let and consider the next preferences of the 
voters or not.
Proportional systems, on the other hand, have many different versions. The 
general categorisation is between those letting candidate-based casting (STV) and 
party-based casting (list-PR). A further grouping is made among the list-PR systems 
according to the mathematical formulas used in allocation of seats to the parties 
(Highest averages vs. Largest remainders).
PR systems are once more classified according to their districting, that is, 
whether the seats are allocated according to one kind of district (single-tier districting), 
or two kinds of districts (two-tier districting). Among the two-tier districted countries, 
Germany is the most popular one. For half of the representatives are elected by PR in 
large constituencies, and the other by simple plurality in single-member 
constituencies.
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The semi-proportional system of SNTV in Japan is no more in use after the 
electoral reform of 1994,
Although many political scientists, following Duverger^, state that electoral 
system is not the sole determinant of a country's political development, electoral 
system, as an independent variable, has important consequences. Mainly they affect 
first, the proportionality of the electoral results and next, the party system 
characteristics. Next, they are influential on the nature of parties, the representation of 
different V\&ns (such as women, and ethnic or religious minorities), the accountability, 
and governability of the party system.
Although every electoral system is disproportional to a certain extent, the 
degree of disproportionality differs from one system to another. The plurality and 
majority-plurality formulas naturally have the highest rates of disproportionality, while 
the PR systems, result lower indices of disproportionality. Other than the formula, the 
legal thresholds and the assembly size are also affective on the disproportionality rate.
When we consider the consequences of electoral systems on the party system 
characteristics, we find that the plurality systems discourage multipartism, and reduce 
the number of parties cotesting elections to a very great extent, that is these systems 
do not let small parties to be represented in the parliament. PR systems on the other 
hand, do not reduce the elective parties sharply during the allocation of seats to the 
parties.
The plurality and majority-plurality systems tend to generate parliamentary 
majorities easier than the PR systems. However, these majorities are mostly 
manufactured, that is with less than 50% of votes they obtain the majority of the seats.
In PR however, the rate of meeting a manufactured majority is very low, as the vote- 
seat shares are almost equal.
Double-ballot, STV and alternative voting are those systems which weaken the 
party disciplines by letting the voters to use preference votes. On the other hand, in 
list-PR systems party oligarchy is the most important factor.
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The proportionality (or disproportionality) rate is again important with respect to 
the representation of different views. PR formulas perform better with the 
representation of different views in the parliament. On the other hand, plurality and 
majority-plurality systems seem to be better with the accountability of the 
representatives as they are often practised in single-member constituencies.
For the governability principle, it is difficult to say 'this does better" because 
while the conventional thinking was that majoritarian systems are more governable, 
Lijphart proved it to be wrong.
Besides the view defending that electoral systems have certain political 
consequences, another group treats them as the dependent variable, that is, in 
relation to the social and political changes. Thus, the specifics of a nation's history, 
social structure and political culture also affects, how an electoral system is used and 
what it produces.
4.2 EXPERIENCES of TURKEY
When differentiation of electoral rules are concerned, Turkey seems to be a rich 
source. After gaining experience with different kinds of representative institutions for 
one-and-a-half century, the first competitive elections took place in 1950. Until 1957, 
a strange system-simple plurality system with multi-member constituencies by party 
lists- has been in use. In 1954 election, this strangeness, however, gave the highest 
disproportionality rate of the Turkish electoral history; 32.24%. Both this one, and the 
other two elections witnessed indices of disproportionality that are higher than the 
world-wide averages.
This, of course, had the effect of crushing small parties and creating 
parliamentary majorities, two of them being earned majorities. These majorities, 
however, heightened the dictatorial tendency of DP, which in turn increased the 
polarisation between the two largest parties.
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In 1961, the PR system with d'Hondt was adopted as against the unjust and 
disproportionate electoral results of the 50s, But between 1961 and 1977, many 
versions of PR has been experienced just for the sake of narrow political interests.
Not surprisingly, the disproportionality rates were lower than those of the 50s. 
1965 elections, in which "national remainder" system has been used, gave the most 
proportional result of Turkish electoral history; 1.02%
In parallel with the general consequences of PR, in the 1961-1977 period 
parliamentary majorities were difficult to find as a natural result of the increase in the 
number of parliamentary parties. Of the five elections, only two has produced 
parliamentary majorities, one of them beitig earned. However, the other three has 
given unstable coalition periods, and even deadlock situations, preventing the efficient 
working of both the government and the parliament.
The system practised after 1980, thus, aimed to prevent the unstable 
governments, by means of maintaining governments based on the majority of a 
single party. High national and constituency thresholds were adopted so that the 
minor parties would be eliminated. Constituency sizes were reduced in order to favour 
big parties. All these changes toward a lower rate of proportionality, helped the 
Motherland Party to gain the parliamentary majority, 53%, with 45% of the votes in 
1983.
When the Motherland Party's vote share began to decline, the party leadership 
tried to gain the same parliamentary majority by means of introducing changes in the 
electoral laws. Indeed these changes worked and MP, won 64.9% of the parliamentary 
seats by only 36.3 of the total votes, thus being 28.6% over-represented in 1987.
Before 1991 elections, however, MP realised that it could not pass the higher 
thresholds and thus, the constituency thresholds were reduced. This, resulted a 
decrease within the disproportionality index, from 23.74% in 1987 to 11.34% in 1991, 
However, the changes realised for the 1991 elections were valid only for that election. 
That is, if no system change takes place, Turkey will use her electoral law of 1987. 
With that system returning highly fragmented and disproportional results, it has been
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found that a party having slightly more than 20% of the votes can easily gain the 
majority of the parliament.
The results of the last municipal elections, that is Welfare Party's unexpected 
victory, speeded up the searches for an electoral reform.
4.3 THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL REFORM
A model which is to "overcome all the shortcomings" is an ideal one being 
proportional/fair, and maintaining stability. However, these two principles are two polar 
opposites and it is impossible to have both at the same time. Therefore, if we are to 
develop a model to "overcome most of the shortcomings," thari we have to search a 
model in which some concessions should be given either for the sake of fairness if we 
want stability, or for the sake of stability if what we need is fairness. And as Ozbudun 
argues, from which principle and to what extent these concessions should be given is 
a choice changing from time to time and from country to country.^
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the electoral reform alternatives, for 
Turkey, are not unlimited. The majoritarian alternatives are the double-ballot and 
majoritarian compromise, both trying to maintain the election of a party having the 
majority support of the voters.
The PR alternatives seem to be either the medium-range proportional formulas 
such as, d'Hondt or modified sainte-Lagu6 without thresholds, STV, or German 
Additional Member System with two tiers. However, the latter two systems would give 
nearly perfect proportionality, operate for the disadvantage of the larger parties and 
thus, would not gain the sympathy of the larger parties.
Pippa Norris, observing the electoral system transitions in 1993 and 1994 
makes a distinction between long-term facilitating conditions and short-term catalysts 
contributing towards change.^ For the Turkish case the long-term conditions are; 
i. significant changes in the established party-system because of the increasing 
fragmentation, weakening party loyalties, and the rise of antidemocratic parties 
(Welfare Party and Nationalist Action Party);
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ii. socio-economic condition and governmental failures which arose the public outcry.
According to Norris, on the other hand, short-term catalysts may include 
particular circumstances, leaders and events surrounding reform, the policies of party 
factions and their legislative behaviour in government coalitions, and the extra- 
parliamentary role of the reform movement, pressure groups and the media. In 
Turkey, the most ambitious group for the electoral reform is the political scientists, 
followed by the journalists, and at last the politicians. Except for a few articles in the 
press, none of the parties has made their positions clear. There does not exist a 
strong extra-parliamentary reform movement which can influence the politicians.
In fact, it is very difficult to find a broad consensus on the kind arid 
characteristics of an electoral law, for the majoritarian formulas give advantage to 
bigger parties whilst the proportional ones makes the representation of minor parties 
easier. Therefore, it will be the political parties who will say the last word, that is to say, 
it lies in the hands of the politicians to enact such legislation. However, during the 
periods of electoral change in the 1990s, it has been witnessed that politicians were 
unwilling to change the electoral system, especially to an unknown one, and preferred 
the handling of a known one for the sake of re-election. ^  I, therefore agree with Norris 
that "electoral systems are rarely designed, they are born kicking and screaming into 
the world out of a messy, incremental compromise between contending factions 
battling for survival"®.
As a last word, I should mention that the electoral formula, or law, is not the 
only thing that maintains the stability of the regime. There are many variables that are 
responsible for the stability of the regime, and the electoral formula is only one, but an 
important one of these variables. Among the other variables, there lies the system of 
delegates, the candidate-selection policies of each political party, working of the 
parliaments, respect for the opposition, ability to build strong-based alliances, 
democratic-mindedness of the citizens. Put in another way, there lies the political 
culture of the society.
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 ^ Arend Lijphart, Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 150.
 ^ "One cannot say that a certain electoral system determines that political life will take this form or that 
form, but simply that it tends to have this or that effect, that is to say that it reinforces elements pushing in 
one direction and weakens those pushing in the opposite direction." from Maurice Duverger as quoted in 
William Hale, "The Role o f the Electoral System in Turkish Politics," International Journal o f  Middle East 
Studies 11 (May 1980); p. 401.
 ^ Ergun Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye," (Electoral Systems and Turkey) unpublished article, p. 
18.
Pippa Norris, "Introduction: The Politics o f  Electoral Reform," International Political Science Review 16, 
N o.l (January 1995): p. 7.
" Ra3nnond V.Christensen, "Electoral Reform in Japan. How it was enacted and changes it may bring," 
.Asian Survey 34, No. 7 (July 1994).
 ^Norris, p. 4
APPENDIX
Proportional Representation
Formulas
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PR formulas are classified first into list-PR and STV, and list-PR is further 
subclassified into highest averages (i.e. divisor formulas) and largest remainders (i.e. 
quota formulas).·
A.1. HIGHEST AVERAGES FORMULAS
Table A.1 and A.2 shows the working of the most-used two highest averages methods 
for the translation of votes into seats.
D'Hondt Formula: This formula uses the integers 1.2,3,4,.,., as divisors. The votes 
won by the parties are divided sequentially by these divisors and then, seats are 
awarded to parties having the highest shares. If the constituency magnitude is 6, for 
example, then parties having the highest six shares will win seats.
Table A.1. A  case study for the operation o f  D*hondt Formula in a six member district.
Party Votes
V v/1 v/2 v/3
seats
A 41000 41000Ф 20500® 13667® 3
В 29000 29000® 14500® 9667 2
C 17000 17000® 8500 1
D 13000 13000 0
Source: Arend Lijphart, Electorat Systems and Party Systems (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p.l54.
Note: Ф, Ф, Ф, ®, ® , Ф sym bolise the order in which the seats are allocated to the related parties.
As the table shows, in our example case, the first seat goes to the largest 
party (party A) (assuming that they have all been divided into the first divisor, i.e. 1), 
whose votes are then divided by the second divisor, that is, 2. The second seat is 
won by party B, as its 'average' (29 000 votes) is higher than C's and D's averages 
(that is their original votes), and higher than A's new average. After winning the seat 
B's votes are divided by 2, too. The third seat is won by party A as its new average is 
higher than B's new average and C's and D's original votes This procedure goes on
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and at the end, all seats are allocated to parties. Finally, party A wins 3, party B wins 
2 and party C wins 1 seat in that 6-seated constituency.
Modified Sainte-Lagud Formula.
In fact, there is not so much difference between the D'hondt formula and either 
the original or modified Sainte-Lagu6 formulas. The original one uses the odd-integer 
divisor series 1, 3, 5, 7,.,. while the modified version starts with 1.4 instead of 1 as the 
first divisor. Mostly the modified version is used.
As seen in Table A. 2., the sequence of the operation in allocating seats to 
parties is identical to that of the d'Hondt formula. However, although the first five seats 
are awarded to the parties in exactly the same order as in the preceding case, the 
sixth seat is won by party D instead of A. Thus, the final allocation of seats becomes:
2 seats for party A, 2 for Party B, 1 for party C and 1 for party D.
Table A.2. A case study for the operation o f  Modified Sainte-Lague Formula in a six member district.
Party Votes
V v/1.4 v/3 v/5
seats
A 41000 29286® 13667® 8200 2
B 29000 20714® 9667® 5800 2
c 17000 12143® 5667 1
D 13000 9286® 1
Source. Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p.l54.
Note. ® , ® , ® , ®  symbolise the order in which the seats are allocated to the related parties.
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A.2. LARGEST REMAINDERS FORMULAS
Three most common largest remainders formulas, or quota formulas, are the ones 
that use Hare, Droop and Imperiali quotas.Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 show the 
operation of these formulas.
The first step is to calculate the quota, that is, the minimum number of votes a 
party need in order to gain a seat. Accordingly, a party gains as many seats as it has 
quotas of votes. If there remains any seats unallocated, those parties having the 
largest number of remaining votes win these seats automatically.
The Hare quota is the oldest and simplest of the quotas; it is simply the total 
number of valid votes divided by the number of valid votes. Table A.3. shows the 
working of that quota.
Table A.3. A case study for the operation o f  largest remainder formula with Hare quota in an eight-
Party Votes Hare full quota Remaining Remaining Total
quotas seats© votes seats© seats
A 41000 3.28 3 3500 0 3
B 29000 2.32 2 4000 0 2
C 1700 1.36 1 4500 1 2
0
D 13000 1.04 1 1 500 0 1
Source: Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p.l55.
Notes: ® - the seats won by filling the Hare quotas one or more times. ®  - the seats won by the
party (parties) having the largest remainder.
As seen, the number of quotas each party won is calculated by dividing each 
party’s votes by the quota. Accordingly, parties receive one seat for each full quota. If 
there remains any unallocated seats (in our example there is one), the parties having 
the largest "remaining votes" win them. In the working of largest remainder formula 
with the Droop quota, the only difference is that Droop quota is calculated by dividing 
the total number of votes by the number of seats plus 1. Table A.4 shows how the 
formula operates with the same data but with Droop quota.
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Table A.4. A case study for the operation o f  largest remainder foimula with Droop quota in an eight-
Party Votes Droop
----------------
full quota Remaining Remaining Total
quotas seats® votes seats® seats
A 41000 3.69 3 7667 1 4
B 29000 2.61 2 6778 0 2
c 17000 1.53 1 5889 0 1
D 13000 1.17 1 1889 0 1
Source: Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p.155.
Notes. ®  - the seats won by jSUing the Droop quotas one or more times. ®  - the seats won by the 
party (parties) having the largest remainder.
Table A.5. A case study for the operation o f  largest remainder formula with Imperiali quota in an eight-
Party Votes Imperial! full quota Remaining Total
quotas seats® seats® seats
A 41000 4.10 4 0 4
B 29000 2.90 2 0 2
c 17000 1.70 1 0 1
D 13000 1.30 1 0 11
Source: Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p.l55.
Notes: 3) - the seats won by filling the Imperiali quotas one or more times. 0) - the seats won by the 
party (jrarties) having the largest remainder.
The largest remairuders formula is also used with the Im periali quota. This 
quota divides the total number of votes by the number of seats plus 2.  ^ Table A.5 
illustrates the working of the largest remainders formula with the Imperiali quota.
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As the eight of the seats of the district are allocated in the quota-filling phase 
and thus, there is no seats remaining, there is no need for the calculation of 
remaining votes.
As Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5 show, the proportionality decreases as the quota 
decreases. For instance, the use of Droop or Imperiali quota, instead of the Hare 
quota causes party C (a smaller party) to lose a seat and party A (the largest party) to 
win an extra seat. The reason behind this fact is that, lowering the quota will reduce 
the number of remaining seats which is not good for the small parties. The maximum 
disadvantage for small parties occurs when there are no remaining seats, (like that in 
Table A.5)
A.3. SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE (STV)
STV is different from other PR formulas, for voters make preferences among the 
individual candidates, instead of party lists. But resembling the largest remainders 
formulas, STV requires the choice of a quota, which is mostly the Droop quota. 
However, this quota is defined slightly different than the one we introduced above:
STV Droop quota = [Total votes / (seats + 1)] + 1 
In the case illustrated in Table A.6 below, the STV Droop quota is calculated to 
be 26, while standard Droop quota defined in the preceding section is 25. Before 
seeing the operation of STV in Table A.6, it may be useful to present the voters' 
preferences in our case study :^
15 ballots. P-Q-R 3 ballots: R-P-Q 17 ballots. U
15 ballots: P-R-Q 20 ballots: S-T 13 ballots: V
8 ballots. Q-R-P 9 ballots. T-S
In the first count, ail of the ballots are arranged according to first preferences. If 
a person maintains the STV Droop quota, he or she is elected. In our example. Party 
A is elected at first as he/she had 4 more votes than the quota.
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Table A.6. Operation o f  the S T \’ in a 3-member constituency with 7 candidates.
Candidate 1. count 2. count 3.count 4.count 5.count 6. count
P 30© -4 = 26 26 26 26 26
Q 8 - 2 =  10 + 5 =  15 15 15 15
R 3 ■^ 2 = 5 -5 = 0 0 0 0
s 20 20 20 +9 = 9 -3 = 26 26
T 9 9 9© -9 = 0 0 0
u 17 17 17 17 17 I79C
V 13 13 13 13 1 3 0 -13 = 0
Source. Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p,158
Notes. @ - elected; 0  - eliminated; 3C - having the plurality o f  vote is elected.
In the second count, P's surplus votes are translated to his next lower 
preferences, half to Q and half to R as the original 30 ballots with P as the first 
preference were also split equally between the two (Q and R) as second preferences. 
After translating these surplus votes, since none of the candidate fills the quota, the 
weakest candidate, that is R, is eliminated and his 5 votes are transferred to the next 
preference on the ballots (that is, Q) in the third count. This procedure goes on until S 
gains the needed number of votes and is elected. In the fifth count, his (S's) 3 surplus 
votes should be transferred to the next preferences. However, as there was not any 
preferences after S in the ballots, these votes can not be translated. In the last count, 
V (the weakest candidate) is eliminated and his/her votes can not be transferred 
because of the non-existence of preferences.
Finally we have at hand, one remaining seat and two candidates with votes 15 
and 17. The larger one, that is U (with 17 votes), is elected.
* Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party' Systems. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p, 153.
■ This quota is used in Italy, and this country has used an even lower quota between 1948 and 1953. They 
divided the total number o f  votes b\· the number o f  seats plus 3. ( total votes / (seats + 3)). Ibid., p. 156.
 ^ The example is taken from ibid., p. 158.
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